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CHAPTER I 
WILLIAM JAMES: INFLUENCES UPON HIS LIFE AND WORK 
William James was born on January 11, 1842, in New York City, thua 
beginning a full and complex lite which was to pull together in his 
person many influences of his time and set loose many more for the time 
to come. His thought and writings grew out of his personal and often 
painful search tor truth and meaning and were a blend of his family back-
ground, his own interests and studies, and the intellectual milieu of his 
time. T'hese influences combined to make the religious question perhaps 
the basic issue of his life. 
'.l'he purpose of this stud7 is to focus on the religious question, 
beginning with a biograplJ1 of James and moving in the aecond chapter to 
his foundations for belief. Over against his ecientific background was 
his struggle with the possibility of going beyond strictly scientific 
findings, of belieri.ng "be;yond the evidence." In justifying belief in 
h1J>otheses that go beyond particular sciences and embrace a more all-
encompassing world view, he developed his understanding of rationality, 
his "sentiment of rationality," including much aore than pure reason. 
This consideration of his justification of belief in general will 
lead, in the third chapter, to an evaluation of the religious hypothesis 
in particular, from the viewpoint of the rationality of individual re-
ligious experiences. An examination ot !!'!.!. Varieties ,2! Religious 
ljlxperience will reveal his conviction that religious experience is not 
1 
2 
something irrational, to be tolerated in those who have not yet outgrown 
its need. And yet it is not rational either, in the sense of a strictly 
logical and theoretical rationality. Rather, religious experience pro-
duces the "sentiment of rationality" that touches both theoretical and 
practical reason, the entire human person. 
Family influence upon William James begins already with his grand-
father William, the first of the James family to come to this country 
from Ireland in 1789. He settled in Alb&.111, New York, where his ambition 
and business ability amassed an estate worth three million dollars, 
guaranteeing the economio securit7 of his children and grandchildren and 
making possible the widespread traveling that was to be an essential part 
ot william's education. But the elder william James had also hoped to 
transmit his Calvinistic puritanism to his children and grandchildren. 
His son Henry and his grandson William each reacted against this Calvin-
ism in his own way, and in time worked out his own religious stance. But 
in them as in other members of the family, the religious conflict contri-
buted to serious mental disorders, as much an inheritance from the elder 
William aa his financial estate.1 
William's father, Henry Senior, began already as a child to rebel 
against the God ot Calvinism who, he was taught, hated and scowled upon 
all the simple joys of nature which were so exhilarating for the young 
boy. He continued to pursue this love of the outdoors, with an uneaai-
nesa about its etf ect on his salvation, until a tragic accident cost him 
1Edward Carter Moore, William James (New York: waahington Square 
Presa, 1965), 3-7. 
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his leg. As a thirteen-year-old school boy helping to put out a fire 
caused by an experiment, he was severely burned, resulting in two ampu-
tations above the knee.2 
His physical movement was now restricted, but he was still very 
much alive to the pleasures of his day, acd a cause of concern to his 
Calvinistic father. "His worldly interests and animal spirits were at 
war with his humanity, and both were at war with his traditional piet7.'.3 
He moved restlessly to various occupations, studied for a time for the 
ministry, and finally set out upon a lifetime effort to develop and 
articulate hia own religious thought. His restlessness was geographical 
as well as intellectual, and even his marriage and the birth of his first 
aon, William, did not keep him from moving back and forth between Albany 
and New York City.4 
Along with the task of spreading his religious views, Henry Senior 
undertook the education of his children. He had little faith in schools, 
and wanting to prevent the lives of his children from being isolated and 
stagnant, he transferred them to several places, including England, 
France, and Switzerland for their education. His interest always was to 
develop their talents with the greatest amount of freedom possible. From 
this restless interest of his father in his education, William acquired a 
knowledge of French and German and an experience of museums, theaters, 
2a.q Wilson Allen, William Jamee (New York: Viking Press, 1967), 
6-7 
3Ralph Barton Perry, The Thou t and Character of William James: 
Briefer Version (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1 , P• 6. 
4Allen, william James, P• 10. 
and people as well as schools in Europe.5 
'l'he restless search for new experiences and situations, then, waa 
part of the inheritance passed on to William b7 his father, along with 
an intense interest in the place of rnan in this world and a genuine 
religious sensitivity and concern.6 William would not come to share 
the particular religious views of his father, but he would share the 
search for religious insight into man, his world, and his God. 
It was an already well-traveled William James, then, who returned 
from Europe with his family in 186o and settled in Newport, where he 
began to study painting in the studio of Morris Hunt. He had been 
sketching and drawing while in Europe, as well as ad.miring works of art, 
and he wanted to teat his interest in painting as a career.? Although 
he abandoned the idea within a year, his interest in art had been genu-
ine and left traces on his later philosophical stance. Even as a phi-
losopher he retained an artistic mind with its interest in the concrete, 
particular, and individual, and an impatience with abstractions.8 
His search for a career then brought him in 1861 to Harvard. He 
was already well acquainted with the intellectual movements of his time. 
Eaerson in fact had been a frequent visitor to the James residence as 
5Bernard P. Brennan, William James ( New York: Twtqne Publishers, 
Inc., 1968), 24-26. 
6John J. McDermott, ed., The writings of \riilliam James (New York: 
Random House, 1967), xix. 
?Brennan, William James, 26-?. 
8Allen, 'William James, P• 497. 
5 
William was growing up, and through l)nerson he met Thoreau. But James 
was not attracted to the transcendental movement, finding its separation 
from real life to lead to futility. Ha:"Vard at that time was a center 
for literary celebrities an well, but it was science that James had 
chosen to study, building upon an interest he had had from boyhood in 
observation and the use of instruments. 
His scientific studies revealed a basic quality of his mind, his 
eager but impatient search for knowledge. He could not stay long with 
the same task, partly because of poor health but partly because tha 
"power of his mind lRY largely in its extreme mobility, its darting, 
exploratory impulsiveness. It was not a mind which remained stationary 
• • • but a mind which traveled widely--now here and now there--seeing 
all things for iteelf ."9 
James began his scientific studies with chemistry, but his teacher, 
Charles William Elliot, was soon to notice his frequent "unsystematic 
excursions" into other sciences and areas of thought. From chemiatl"1 
he moved to the study of comparative anatomy and peysiology, being par-
tioularly impressed with his teacher, Jeffries Wyman, and his devotion 
10 to truth, his disinterestedness, accuracy, and thoroughness. It was 
through "Wyman that Jwnea became interested in evolution, a view he 
would eventually have to reconcile with his religious interest. His 
studies next brought him to biology, lending in 1865 to a one-year 
9Perry, The 'l'hougl!t and Character of William James: Briefer 
VerRion, p.66. 
6 
expedition to Brazil with Louis Agassiz to collect specimens of marine 
animals for the new Agassiz Museum. But in the meantime, in 1864, 
James had entered still another area by beginning studies in the 
Medical School. Throughout this time, while his mind was wandering 
restlessly through cbemistey, comparative anat0lll1', biology, to medicine, 
it traveled as well through the whole field of literature, history, and 
11 philosoplV'• In addition to reading widely in areas other than science, 
he kept up an interest in philosopbJ especially through discussions 
with friends, among them Charles Peirce, ChaUD.01 Wright, J;endell Holmes, 
and Thomas Ward. Aa all tour were disposed toward naturalism or acepti-
oism, the contact provided James with a contrast to the strong religious 
emphasis of his father.12 
In April of 1867 James again interrupted his medical studies and 
sailed for Europe. His health had not 'been good, plagued as he was with 
insolmia, trouble with bis stomach, e1es, and back, and at timea deep 
depression, all of which contributed to his already natural restleaanesa 
and limited the amount of reading and research he could do. Also, he 
had become interested in experimental plV'siology at the Medical Sohool, 
and he hoped by going to Gerrr&an7 to pursue that interest and perfect bis 
knowledge of German.13 He returned to America in November, 1868, con-
tinued his medical studies at Harvard, and passed his medical exam on 
June 21, 1869. 
11Ibid., P• 71. 
12Ibid., P• 78. 
-
13 Ibid., P• 79. 
-
7 
In April, 1870, William James underwent a spiritual crisis which 
was to be a turning point in his life. His spirits had been low tor 
maey reasons, including again his poor health, but the real basis tor 
the crisis was "the ebbing of the will to live, for lack of a philoaopey 
to live by-a paralysis ot action occasioned by a sense of moral impo-
14 tenoe." James had studied science tor several years, and he was well 
acquainted with the materialists and determinists of his time and their 
reduction of emotional and mental processes to the blind operation of 
mechanical f'orces.15 But he could not accept the "iron blocklf universe 
of' the determiniats, nor what appeared to be the closed systems of Kant, 
Hegel, Leibniz, and much of the philosophical tradition, in which all the 
parts are so formed that all future conditions and combinations are 
settled. He needed a universe where man was not mora.l.JJ' impotent, but 
rather could make a dif terence by his choices and his actions. It was 
especialq by reading Charles Renouvier whom he had met in F'rance that 
he was now able to save himself' from despair and possible suicide by 
deliberately choosing to believe in free will:16 
I think that yesterda;y was a crisis in my lite. I finished 
the first part of Renouvier's second Essaia and see no reason 
why his definition of free will-"the Sll8taining of a thought 
because I ohooae to when I might have other thoughts"-need 
be the definitionof an illusion. At any rate, I will assume 
14Ibid., P• 120. 
-
15Allen, William James, P• 501. 
16 Ibid., P• 498. 
8 
for the preaent--until next year--that it is no illusion. 
My ti;,t act of tree will shall be to believe in tree 
will. 
This personal crisis was also important for James in his lite as a 
philosopher. That the crisis could only be relieved by a philosophical 
insight indicates what was to be the role of philosop}'q' in his life. 
Philoaopey for James would always be an intensely personal search, al-
ways a part of life and living, never pure theory. Hia gradual and 
painful resolution of this crisis also indicated the type of philosoptq' 
that would draw him on. He could not ignore evil, nor tolerate it, nor 
accept it as inevitable. "Ho philosop}\y could possibly suit him that did. 
not cruididly recognize the dubious fortunes of mankind, and encourage him 
as a moral individual to buckle on his armor and go forth to battle.1118 
Once he had rejected suicide and freely chosen the possibility of 
a creative life and a world open to man's activity, his career of teach-
ing and writing would be a search to discover the truth of this belief. 
In August, 1872, he became an instructor in ph;yaiology at Harvard, where 
he was to move to psycholoa and eventually philosop~. All of his 
studies during this period were interrelated and influenced his approach. 
His work in medicine, anat~, and physiology, for example, would not let 
him be satisfied with the current approach to psychology, stressing the 
soul and ignoring the body.19 He felt a need in hia psychology tor a 
more experime&tal and scientific approach. 
17Perr;y, The T~ougb.t and Character of William James: Briefer 
Version, P• 121. 
18 Ibid., P• 122 
-
19Brennan, William James, P• 39. 
9 
At the same time he waa veJ:'1 interested in evolution and its con-
tributions to science as well as its challenge to religion. His studies 
had been strongly soientitic, and yet his background had been stro~ 
religious. His ovn personal crisis convinced him of the need to move 
beyond purely scientific evidence, while remaining faithful to its find-
ings, and working out this delicate balance would engage his energies 
for years to come. Above all, James brought to hie teaching and writing 
the same restlessness of mind that had characterized his years of study. 
"James•s ovn character and temperament needed change, novelty, and free-
dom for healthy existence, and his own experience had convinced. him that 
he lived in a world in which they could and should operate.',20 
James•s development as a philosopher, therefore, was closely tied 
to his personal life. He reflected on his own experience, and attempted 
to provide philosophical understanding of that experience. His pro-
tessional training was not in philosophy, however, and at times he appears 
weak on what other philosophers had written. At times too be uses tel'llll 
such as "truth" ambiguously, sometimes with the connotations these terms 
have acquired in the historzr of philosop~, sometimes with new meanings 
he has given them. 
In July, 1878, James married Alice Gibbens, who contributed greatly 
to his happiness and the success or his career. Her interest, sympat~, 
and concern helped him through the years of intense activity inter-
mingled with poor health, balancing with her composure his high-strung 
20Allen, william James, P• 516. 
10 
21 
mobility and restlessness. With her help he was able to pursue a 
career of teaching, writing, and lecturing, searching relentless~ 
for insights into man and hie relation to his world, and sharing 
these insights with students, colleagues, and friends with his own 
mixture of clarity, depth, charm, and humor. 
21Perry, The Thou6ht and Character of William James: Briefer 
Versio~ P• 145. 
CHAPT.i!;!~ II 
FOUNDATIONS: THE RATIONALITY OF .BELIEF 
William Jamea'e restless mind and his need for no\•elty would 
hardly have been satisfied with the findings of science alone or the 
workings of pure and abstract reason. Furthermore, his personal 
crisis of 1870 convinced him of the need to choose beyond the scientific 
evidence in order to find a reason to live. In several lectures given 
between 188o and 1896 he worked out his "belief in belief, 11 his juati-
fication for the conviction that at times it was permissible and even 
necessary to go beyond scientific evidence, to believe and act ac-
cordingly rather than waitiug for all the evidence to appear and convince 
the mind. In 1897 he collected these and other essays in The Will to 
---
Believe. In the preface he mentioned the first four essays as being 
"largely concerned with defending the legitimacy of religious faith. n1 
These will be the focus of our attention. 
The title essay, ''The Will to Believe," provides us above all 
with a description of the role belief in general actually plays in our 
lives. Beginning with a definition of terms, James points out that an 
hypothesis is aizything that may be proposed to our belief, and may be 
either live or dead. "A live hypothesis is one that appeals aa a real 
1i.1111iam Janes, The Will to Believe and other Eas s in P 
Philosop!ly (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 19 
11 
12 
possibility to him to whom it is proposed, 1.2 the deadness and liveness 
being relative to the individual thi.Dker and measured by his willing-
ness to act upon the ~othesis. The decision between two hypotheses 
is an option. Options in turn may be living or dead, forced or 
avoidable, momentous or trivia1. A living option is one in which 
both hypotheses are live, such as "Be an agnostic or be a Christian," 
both of which would be understandable and possible for us to act upon. 
A forced option would be a choice baaed on a complete logical dis-
juntion, with no possibility of not choosing-e.g., "Either accept 
this truth or go without it." HEither love me or hate me" would not 
be a forced option, as a person could avoid that choice by remaining 
indifferent. A momentous option is one which involves a unique oppor-
tunity, a significant investment, and an irreversible decision. A 
genuine option, in James•s terms, will then be an option that is living, 
forced, and momentous.' 
Against this background Jamee considers "the actual psychology 
ot human opinion," how we form our convictions and the role in the pro-
cess of our "passional and volitional nature" on the one hand and our 
intellect on the other. It is important to note here that James does 
not use the term "nature" in the technical sense in which it has been 
used in the history of philosop~. It does not refer to any kind ot 
clear~ defined and distinct faculty or source of operations in a sub-
2 Ibid., P• 2. 
-
3Ibid., 2-4. 
-
13 
stantive sense. In some ways, James continues, it seems "simply silly" 
to talk. of ''believing by our volition," as if our will could either 
help or hinder our intellect in its perceptions of truth. "Can we, by 
8.1J3 effort of our will, or b7 ~ strength of wish that it were true, 
believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism 
4 in bed?" Furthermore, allowing our paasional and volitional nature 
into the picture seems rlle as well as silly when we consider "the 
magnificent edifice of the pJ:v'aical sciences," built upon the lives of 
men who remained disinterested and impersonal, not yielding to prefer-
ence or sentiment or their 1'passional nature," but submitting "to the 
icy laws of outer fact.'.5 Freil this point of view, then, it would 
seem that as we form our convictions and opinions, wishing and willing 
are merely "fifth wheels to the coach. ,p 
And 7et, if we would then assume that pure reason alone is what 
settles our opinions, we would "fly quite as directly in the teeth of 
the facts." It is true that our willing nature cannot bring back to 
life ey-potheses that are already dead for us. But what has made them 
dead for us is usually a previous action of our willing nature of an 
antagonistic kind. "Willing nature" tor James includes "all such factors 
of belief as !ear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisan-
ship, the circumpreesure of our caste and set."? And all these factors, 
4 
,;. Ibid., P• 
-
5Ibid., P• 7. 
6Ibid., P• 8. 
7 9. Ibid., P• 
-
14 
he maintains, have an influence upon which hypotheses we in fact con-
aider alive and which dead. 
Very often indeed we accept opinions because of their prestige 
more than their inner clearness, and our reason is often satisfied "it 
it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in ease our credulity 
is criticised by someone elae."8 Even our belief in truth itselt, our 
conviction that there is such a thing as truth and our minds are made 
tor it, is affected by our willing nature. We want to believe that our 
experiments and studies bring us closer to the truth and we agree to 
proceed accordingly. But if a sceptic asks ua how we know there is 
such a thing as truth, we cannot prove it logically. It is just one 
volition against another. Finally, we tend to disbelieve all tacts and 
theories for which we have no use. Huxley, tor example, has no use for 
bishops and sacerdotaliam in his life and theretore disbelieves, while 
Newman finds a need for the same priestly system and ''finds all sorts 
ot reasons good f'or staying there."9 
It seems clear, then, that non-intellectual forces influence our 
convictions. In the actual psychology of human opinion, the way in 
-
which our convictions are in fact formed, pure insight and logic do not 
--
play the only role. But is this actual situation also pathological and 
reprehensible, or is it to be accepted as normal? This brings us to the 
thesis of the essay: 
8 Ibid., P• 9. 
9 Ibid., P• 10. 
-
15 
Our passional nature not only lavtully may, but must, decide 
an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine 
option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual 
grounds; for to 88:1• under such circumstances, "Do not decide, 
but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision, 
--just like deciding yes or no1a-and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth. 
In doing "a bit more of preliminary work" before tackling the thesis, 
Jamea points out that he is consciously rejecting scepticism and notes the 
two wa;ys we can hold that our minds can indeed find truth. The absolutists 
claim that they can know the truth and know for certain that th91 know it, 
-
while the empiricists maintain that although they f1a1 attain truth they 
cannot infallibly know when.11 James rejects the objective certitude ot 
the absolutists and denies that the intellect has 8.D1 infallible signal tor 
knowing when it has the truth. This does not mean that the empiricist 
gives up the quest tor truth. He still believes that he gains "an e'V'er 
better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experi-
ences and think. 1112 But rather than expecting to know for certain that an 
hypothesis is true, he says that ''if the total drift of thinking continues 
to confirm it, that is what he means by its being true."13 
James then states the two great commandments for would-be knowers: 
"We IDU8t know the truth; and we must avoid error."14 But, he points out, 
---- --------
these are two separable laws, and our emphasis on one or the other colore 
10Ibid., P• 11. 
11Ibid., P• 12. 
12Ibid. 1 P• 17 
1
'Ibid. 
14Ibid. 
16 
our whole intellectual lite. Our primary concern may be to avoid error 
at all costa, and never risk belief on insufficient evidence, or we may 
feel that approaching real knowledge is worth the risk of sometimes 
being in error. But again, the choice between the two attitudes is not 
decided on strictly logical grounds but on the basis of our 0 passional 
life." James, who had al.ready indicated that empiricism was his approach, 
also comes down on the side of an active search for truth, being willing 
to live with the risk of error. 
Against this background of the actual influence of our passional 
nature, Jamee continues hia discussion of the legitimacy of this situa-
tion. He grants that at times it is best to vait for more evidence and 
not risk error, especially in scientific questions, which re~ are 
trivial options for us spectators. We are not so much in need, for ex-
" ample, of a theory of the Rontgen r~s that we must decide one wiry or 
the other before the evidence is in. The same is not true for the soi-
entist himself, however, who is not just a spectator, no matter how im-
personal. and objective he mq think he is. While he must remain true 
to the tacts, the investigation is helped along if he has a '*passion.ate" 
desire to get his own faith confirmed. "If you want an absolute duffer 
in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no inter-
est whatever in ita results.n1.5 
But, asks James, are there not sometimes forced options, times 
when we must decide w~thout waiting for more evidence, especially if our 
15 Ibid., P• 21. 
-
17 
main interest is to gain truth and not just avoid error? Moral ques-
tions in particular come to mind as questions whose solution cannot 
wait for sensible proof. "Science can tell us what exists; but to 
compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we 
must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart."16 In moral 
questions there is no chance of waiting for scientific evidence, as 
there is no scientific evidence to wait for. Even to decide whether to 
have or not have moral beliefs is done by our will. 
Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic 
than intellectual scepticifJll can. When we stick to it that 
there .!! truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our 17 whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. 
Furthermore, in some questions, such as those regarding personal 
relations, waiting for the evidence may be self-defeating. If I am won-
dering whether you like me, the result may depend on my assuming it and 
meeting you halt way. 
The previous faith on my part in your liking's existence is 
in such cases what makes your lil<ing come. But if I stand 
aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have obj,8tive 
evidence, • • • ten to one your lilcing nevar comes. 
There can be tilles, then, when faith in something helps bring it about. 
Jamee concludes, "In truths dependent on our personal action, then, 
faith baaed on desire is certain.1.J a lawful and possibly an indispens-
able thing."19 
16Ibid., P• 22. 
-
17Ibid., P• 23. 
-
18 Ibid., 23-4. 
-
19 Ibid., P• 25. 
-
18 
Therefore, what James provides us in the first part ot the essay 
is a psychology of human opinion, a description of how we actuaJ.11 
!orm our convictions, emphasizing that non-intellectual forces do have 
a place, even in the supposedly "passionless" sphere of science. Logi-
cal reasoning alone cannot decide the options that determine our stance 
toward the world: scepticism, or the ability to know truth; absolutism 
or empiricism; an emphasis on seeking truth• or trying above all to 
avoid error. And in many other cases we not only may but must believe 
beyond the evidence or risk the loss of truth or good by our inactivity. 
At times our belief can even help create the truth. 
This essay gives us an indication of James's understanding of 
truth. which receives further development in later works as his prag-
matic theory of truth. At times he uses the term ambiguously, but the 
important point here is that truth for him is not an absolute which can 
be clearly recognized when it is attained. 
James does consider the religious h1J>othesis to aome extent in 
this essay, but we will find a fuller treatment of it in two other es-
says. First, however, we will give further attention to the legitimacy 
of belief in general as described in "The Sentiment or Rationality." 
To attain "a conception of the frame of things which shall on the 
whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which every one 
by nature carries about with him under his hat,',20 is the task which 
philosophers set themselves to perform. But how does the philosopher 
20 Ibid., P• 63. 
-
19 
recognize this rationality when he attains it? As he recognizes every-
thing else, James replies, by certain subjective marks with which it at-
fects him. "A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest, is one of them. 
The transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational compre-
hension is full of lively relief and pleasure."21 Actually this feeling 
of rationality is mainly an absence of irrationality. Just as we feel 
...... 
no particular pleasure when we breathe freely but notice immediately if 
there is any obstruction of our breathing, so too our thoughts ID81 seem 
to flow effortlessly until we meet with some difficulty which strikes 
us as irrational and stops the !lov. It is this flow of the mind 'With-
out the jarring of irrationality, this feeling of "the sufficiency of 
the present moment, ••• this absence of all need to explain it, 
account for it, justify it," that James calls "the ~entiment of Ration-
al~.~ 
One way or obtaining this fluency of thought is the theoretic way. 
As we face the sensible diversity of facts in the world, we have a theo-
retie need tor unity, a need to see that the chaos before u.e is the 
expression of more simple underlying facts, to see for example that such 
apparently diverse objects as the moon and an apple are similar in their 
relation through gravity to the earth. By seeing similarities and find-
ing simplicity we can handle the original data with less mental effort.23 
Alongside this paasion for simplification there exists the passion 
21Ibid •• 
........... P• 63. 
22Ibid., P• 64. .............. 
23Ibid., 
............ 
P• 65. 
20 
tor distinguishing, the impulse to be acquainted with the parts rather 
than to comprehend the whole. This passion 
loves to recognize particulars in their full completeness, 
and the more of these it can carry the happier it is. It 
prefers 8If3 amount of incoherence • • • to an abstract way 
of conceiving things that, while it simplifies them,2i!is-solves away at the same time their concrete .fulness. 
Both or these demands must be met, and the combination in a 
particular person will determine his philosophic attitude. But the 
only we.y to balance this diversity and unity is to classify the 
diverse items as cases of a common essence discovered in them. This 
determines the characteristic of a theoretic philoeoph1: 
A completed theoretic philosophy can thus never be anything 
more than a completed classification of the world's in-
gredients; and its results must always be abstract, since 
the basis of every classification is the abstract essence 
embedded in the living fact,--the rest of the25iving fact being for the time ignored by the classifier. 
It is this necessity of ignoring "the rest of the living fact" 
that causes the theoretic approach its difficulty. Arq single explana-
tion ot a fact will be limited necessarily to that single point of 
view, leaving out the rest of real lite. At times this theoretic 
approach is helpful and even necessary, but its simple classification 
of things is "a most miserable and inadequate substitute for the ful-
nees of truth, • • • a monstrous abridgment of life, which, like all 
abridgments is got by the absolute loss and casting out of real 
matter. ,-26 While the theoretic approach can serve a purpose, ordi-
24Ibid., P• 66. 
-
25Ibid., 
-
P• 67. 
26Ibid., 
-
P• 69. 
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narily a person will talce nothing as a substitute for life but living 
itself. 
The inability of the theoretic approach to satisfy a person com-
pletely brings James to the practical side of rationality. He begins 
by looking for a "definition of the world which will give back to the 
mind the free motion which has been blocked in a purely contemplative 
path ••• [" andJ make the world seem rational again."27It is conceiv-
able that there could be several views of the world all consistent with 
the facts and satisfying to our purely logical needs. If so, one that 
would awaken our "active impulses" or satisfy other aesthetic demands 
better than the others would be the more rational·one, the one more 
capable of providing the mind with fluency. James then describes the 
tests of rationality our aesthetic and practical nature would use in 
evaluating these several systems equally satisfying to our logical 
needs. 
First of all, it seems "that mere familiarity with things is able 
to produce a feeling of their rationality.u28 When we become accus-
tomed to a thing, so that our mind can pass easily from it back to its 
antecedents and ahead to its consequents and around to the things with 
which it is related, then this fluency of our mind tinges the thing 
with the rational character. But it is especially the relation of a 
thing to its future consequences that is important. Our consciousness 
27 Ibid., P• 75. 
28Ib·d 76 
--!...• t P• • 
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alwoys contains an ingredient of expectancy, which we notice most when 
there is something either vecy painful or vecy pleasant impending. 
Bspecia.lly impending pain keeps us from being at pea~e and at home in 
the present. Even uncertainty about the future can be unsettling, and 
the experience of coming to feel at home in a new place or with new 
people is the gradual lessening of the uncertainty and its accompanying 
uneasiness. As we become acquainted with the range of possibilities in 
the new place and with the new people, the feeling of strangeness 
lessens and we begin to feel at home.29 
A philosophical conception of the universe, if it is to be ac-
cepted as rational, must also at least in a general way banish uncer-
tainty from the future. Buch an attempt to satisfy expectancy has al-
ways been a fundamental part of ultimate explanations ot the universe. 
There lll81 be views which emphasize the uncertainty of the future, but 
these generally will be reactions to overly-confident optimistic views. 
For the moat part it can be said that the first test our practical and 
aesthetic nature would use in evaluating a conception of the universe 
is its ability to define expectancy, to describe the future at least in 
a general wa:y.30 Man needs a conception ot what the universe is like 
which includes some kind of assurance that basically and generally the 
universe will continue to be as it is. Such a view does not eliminate 
the possibility of change, but assures a person that the changes will 
29 Ibid., 77-8. 
-
30 Ibid., 79-82. 
-
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not be so radical that he cannot handle them. 
But it is not enough for our nature to de&cribe the future; it 
must do so in a Wa:.f that is congruent with our powera. A pessimistic 
philosophy that tells people the future is incompatible with thei1· de-
sires and active tendencies will be to most men a source of more un-
easiness than uncertainty itself. Better not to kn.ow• than to know 
that our efforts are hopeless. "But a second and worse defect in a 
philosophy than that of contradicting our active propensities is to 
give them no object whatever to press against.'.31 A philosoph;y that 
suggests no future to work for leaves man's most intimate powers with 
no object. "A nameless unheimlichkeit comes over us at the thought of 
there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the objects ot 
those loves and. aspirations which are our deepest energies."32 Down 
through history great achievements have resulted from man being chal-
lenged to uae his active powers, with the promise that the future was 
indeed in some perhaps yet unforseen way compatible with those powers. 
This ability of a philosophy to describe the future in a wa:y that 
challenges man's abilities will be the second test used by our practi-
cal and aesthetic nature in evaluating various views. Personal tempera-
ment enters in here, though, and different men will insist on being 
spoken to in different wa:ys, since men•a active impulses are so differ-
ently mixed.33 
31Ibid., P• 82. 
-
32Ibid., P• 83. 
33Ibid., 
-
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The consideration of the sentiment of rationality in its practical 
aspect now brings us to an element of our activG nature which "philo-
sophers as a rule have with great insincerity tried '.:o huddle out of 
sight in their pretension to found systems of absolute certainty. I 
mean the element of faith.',34 James takes faith to mean 
belief in something concernine which doubt is still theo-
retically possible; and aa the test of belief is willing-
ness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to 
act in a cause the pro~erous issue of which ia not certi-
fied to us in advance. 
Faith is a necessary ingredient in our mental attitude. Dven 
scientific philosophers admit this, but by a. "singularly arbitrary 
caprice they say that it is only legitimate when used in the interests 
of one particular proposition,--the proposition, namely, that the 
course of nature is uniform.',36 This basis !or scientific investigation 
is a working hypothesis, accepted in the beginning on taith. And yet 
the same attitude ot faith in other areas is, according to some scien-
tist::s, illogical and even shameful. But we cannot live or think at all 
without some degree of faith, some willingness to accept a "working 
hypothesis" and act upon it, expecting the results to disappoint us if' 
our assumption has been false.37 
This brings us to a crucial point in James's argument in this 
Yi-Ibid., P• 90. 
35Ibid., P• 90. 
36 Ibid., P• 91. 
37 Ibid., P• 95. 
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eBS81t similar to his conclusion in the previous one, that 
belief (as measured by action) not only does and must 
continuall.7 outstrip scientific evidence, but that there 
is a certain class of truths of whose realit;y belief is 
a factor as well as a confessor; and that as regards this 
class of truths faith is not only licit and pertinent, 
but essential and indispensable. The,gruths cannot become 
true till our faith has made them so. 
Again, there are areas where .faith has no role. ''The future move-
ments ot the stars or the facts of past history are determined now once 
for all, whether I like them or not • ..39 But there are other .facts that 
are not yet determined, and their determinations will depend in part on 
'ffl1 personal contribution. This contribution demands a certain amount 
ot subjective energy which in turn calls tor at least some faith that 
the result will be attained. Take for example the view ot the world as 
either optimistic or pessimistic. I can look at the misery, wickedness, 
and pain in the world, conclude that it is hopeless, and stop trying to 
change the situation. In so doing I am helping in 1ll1 own, perhaps 
small, W81 to make true this belief. But if I look at the same tacts 
with the belief that something can be done about the evils in the world 
and this belief touches my energies and prompts me to try to change the 
situation, then my belief in the optimistic view of the world is helping 
to make that view true. In situations like this where belief contributes 
to truth, it is ridiculous to say that belief has no place.4o 
'l'he investigation now comes to what James calls the radical ques-
38 96. Ibid., P• 
-
39Ibid., 
-
P• 97. 
4o Ibid., 
-
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tion of lite, "whether this be at bottom a moral or an unmoral uni-
41 
verse." Does faith have a role in determining this fundamental 
issue? This really is the question ot materialism, which James 
summarizes as follows: 
Is the world a simple brute actuality, an existence 2 
facto about which the deepest thing that can be said 
is that it happens so to be; or is the judgment of 
better or worse, ot oupt, as intimately perti~nt to 
phenomena as the simple judgment is or is not? 
- --
For the materialist, the words "good" and "bad" have no meaning 
"apart from subjective passions and interests which we may, it we 
please, play fast and loose with at wil1.n43 When his feelings are at 
war with the tacts around him, he "is always free to seek barmoJV" by 
toning down the sensitiveness of the feelings. n44 But for the moralist 
there are certain things which not only !!:!. but o¢t to be, and when 
there is a claah with the world he cannot simply gain harmo~ by sacri-
ficing his ideal interests. There are therefore times when the two 
views will call tor different action, and it is this difference in 
behavior that assures us that we have here a meaningful issue.45 
Each view will call upon us to live its eypothesis and judge by 
our experience that it is the true one. And we can expect in a question 
41~ •• P• 103. 
42Ibid. 
-
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-
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-
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of this scope that "the experience of the entire human race must make 
the verification, and that all the evidence will not be 'in' till ••• 
the last man has had his aay.046 Then it will be clear whether this 
was "at bottom a moral or an unmoral universe." But in the meantime 
our initial faith certainly has a role to play. If we belieYe that it 
.!!. a moral universe where 'good' and 'better' apply, and then we live 
according to this belier. we are helping to create a moral universe just 
as certainly as our initial belief in an "unmoral" universe will help 
to create that one. Certainly we cannot keep our faith out of the 
question and doubt. To doubt that the universe is moral and therefore 
not act is in effect to de~ that it is moral. 
What James provides in this essay ia a description of his meaning 
ot "rationality" and how the mind recognizes it. In the history of 
philosophy, rationality connotes universal and necessary knowledge, 
with an emphasis on thought and logical reasoning. James opposed this 
conception of rationality, especially as he felt it was embodied in the 
systematic and theoretical philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Leibniz, and 
others. This type of rationality puts too much emphasis on thought 
alone and separates it too distinctly from feeling. Jamea•s key phrase, 
the sentiment of rationality, indicates that for him feeling and thought 
are part of the same context, intertwined in man's experience. He had 
indicated this earlier in!!!!_ Principles .2! Psyoholog;r, pointing out the 
similarity of feeling and thought in that both are part ot cognition.47 
46 Ibid., P• 107. 
-
4
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In the present ess~ he states that rationality is recognized b7 the 
feeling ot ease and peace it arouses in a person. Rationalit1 tor 
James is much more than thought alone. It is closer perhaps to the 
feeling a person has when he finds that his experience makes sense 
or is reasonable, when he is able to deal with that experience without 
being jarred b7 inconsistencies. 
Rationality as James understands it is the key term in this 
study. The present chapter is a description of James•s view that 
belief in general and religious belief in particular are reasonable 
in the sense of producing this sentiment of rationality. The third 
chapter will examine particular religious experiences to determine 
their rationality in this broader Jamesian sense. 
Essential to his view is the role of the practical reason in main-
taining the fluency of thought which he takes to be rationality. Im-
portant too is the description of the inner needs of man that must be 
met by a philosophic view, demanding of a system of thought not just 
logical consistency, but the ability to describe the future at least 
in a general way and in a manner that encourages a person's abilities. 
Faith is an essential element in this practical W81 of conceiving the 
universe, and in ~ questions, including the basic character or the 
universe, faith in a view can help to make it true. 
A further description ot the basic needs or man in determining 
his world view is given in the essay "Is Life worth Living?" It indi-
cates as well what religion can do, positively and negatively, in 
meeting these basic needs. 
James notes that some people would answer the question "Is life 
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worth living?" with an enthusiastic "yes" because of their built·in 
optimism and their inability to believe that ~thing serious~ evil 
can exist. But this is hardly universal, and in fact "the whole 8r1f11 
of suicides" declare that sometimes life is not worth living. His 
-
goal in this essay is to formulate what we might sa:y to a person who 
is weary of life with that "metap~sical tedium vitae which is pe-
culiar to reflecting men," that pessimism that can come from "too 
much questioning and too little active responaibility. 048 
In describing this weariness and this pessimism James makes 
clear that he feels it is a religious disease with its reflective 
source in "the contradiction between the phenomena of nature and the 
craving of the heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit 
whose expression nature is."49 The religious man naturally tends to 
look at the universe and expect to !ind there traces of the wisdom 
and goodness of the God who made it. But in looking at nature and 
the real world he finds so much hideousness with the beauty, so much 
cruelty with the love, and so much death with lite. It ia in this 
contradiction "between the supposed being of a spirit that encompasses 
and owns us • • • and the character of such a spirit as revealed b)' 
the visible world's course',50 that the pessimism and melancholy lie. 
Some men might be able to shrug off or ignore this evil and this 
contradiction, but not the man for whom the "religious craving" is 
48James, The Will to Believe and other Es!&s in Po;pular 
PhilosopbJ, 38-9. 
49 Ibid., P• 4o. 
-
50 Ibid., P• 42. 
-
real. 
This leads, James feels, to 11the inevitable bankruptcy of natural 
religion" with its proofs for a "Moral and Intelligent Contriver of the 
World." We know the evil of nature as well as the good, and we can 
hardly worship unreservedly a God whose adequate expression would be 
that nature. Either there is no God revealed in nature, or he is in-
adequately revealed; and "what we call visible nature, or ~ world, 
must be but a veil and surf ace-show whose full meaning resides in a sup-
plementary unseen or other world."51 
In fact, says James, the first step toward getting into a health1' 
relationship with the universe may be to rebel against this God of 
natural religion who is tied so directly to the evil of the world. It 
is precisely the implied contradiction between such a supposedly good 
God and a world mixed with evil that causes the pessimism and melanchol.1 
in the religious man. The existence of that kind of God results in a 
"monistic'' view, with God as the "one and only Power" who must therefore 
be the explanation of the evil as well as the good. But if a person can 
be emancipated from this "monistic superatition,n then he can take on 
the evils of the world individually without having to worry about their 
derivation trom the "one and only Power."52 Just this emancipation 
might encourage the person whose pessimism has made him weary of lite to 
go on living now, since the evils he faces are finite ones that he can 
help to overthrow. 
51 Ibid., 4,3-4. 
-
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Eliminating an inadequate view of religion such as this frees a 
man, but is there an;ything more positive that religion itself can do to 
off set this pessimism and weariness of life? Religion and religious 
faith ref er here essentially to the belief "in the existence of an unseen 
order of some kind in whioh the riddles of the natural order mq be found 
explained.053 James•s thesis is 
that we have a right to believe the p~sical order to be 
only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement 
it by an unseen spiritual order which we aasume on trust, 
if o~4thoreby life ~ seem to us better wortn living 
again. 
The mushrooming of dieooveries in science itself indicates that we 
have had only a glimpse of what the universe will event~ prove to be, 
and therefore "the world of our present natural knowledge .!!,. enveloped 
in a larger world of .!2!!. sort of whose residual properties we at present 
can frame no positive idea.n55 While admitting that, agnostic positivism 
tells us that we have no right to suppose a!J1thing about that unseen part 
until we have sensible evidence; we can dream no dreams, form no eypoth-
eses or beliefs. Such neutrality might be possible if we had no stake in 
the unknown. But both doubt and belief involve conduct; doubting the 
religious ~pothesis while waiting for more evidence means living as if 
it were untrue. Furthermore, this neutrality demands that our inner 
interests have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world 
11181 contain. Even if we have an inner need of believing that this world 
53Ibid., P• 51. 
54 52. Ibid., P• 
-
55Ibid., 
-
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of nature is only a sign of something more spiritual and eternal, poai-
tiviam would forbid us to act upon it, although the inner demand on the 
part of scientists for logical harmol\Y in the univer~e has led them to 
many scientific discoveries. 
Science, then, has no authority to tell us not to trust our inner 
need to go beyond the visible world. And trusting our religious demands 
means living in the light of them, acting "as if the invisible world 
they suggest were real. ,,56 If' we could be certain that our bravery and 
patience in facing adversity in this lite were bearing fruit somewhere 
in an unseen spiritual world, even the most adverse life would seem 
worth living. We cannot be certain, and yet scie110e cannot show this 
belief to be impossible, and we are free to trust it at our own risk. 
Furthemore, "optimism and pessimism are definitions of the world, and 
• • • our own reactions on the world, small as they are in bulk, are 
integral parts of the whole thing, and necessarily help to determine the 
definition. ,.57 
James admits that there are ~ "mqbes" connected with believing 
and acting upon the religious }\y'pothesis. But it can give meaning to 
our lives to believe that by our actions something is eternally gained 
for the universe, and that even the visible order of goodness we believe 
in we can help to create. If we believe in the depths of our being and 
are eager to enter the fight, then the scientific veto will sound like 
"mere chattering ot the teeth.'..58 
'
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This essay, therefore, does more than indicate that it is perraias-
ible to believe; it points out what belief can do to make a person's 
life worth living. Once the reflective person has b~en freed from the 
"monistic superstition" and sees that the evils of the world can be 
dealt with singly, the religious eypothesis can challenge his powers to 
work for a better world, trusting that his courage may be bearing fruit 
in an unseen order and helping to create the good he believes in. The 
emphasis is on the inner need ot the person to believe, more than the 
rationale of the religious eypothesis itself. Religious belief does 
not go against the facts, but conceivably at this point there could also 
be other hypotheses to challenge a person's powers and make life worth 
living. 
The fourth essay, "Reflex Action and Theism," will concentrate 
more directly on the religious hypothesis as the one which beat meets 
the basic needs of man. Early in the essay James summarizes what people 
generally know of the theory of reflex action. In p~si.ological terms 
it means that "the acts we perform are always the result of outward dis-
charges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges are 
themselves the result of impression.a from the external world, carried in 
along one or another of our sensory nerves."59 
From being applied at first to just a portion o:f our behavior, the 
theory has been generalized to explain all human behavior. The struc-
tural, unit of the nervous system is seen to form a triad, with sensory 
impression existing only to awaken the central process of reflection• 
.. ,hich in turn exists only for the sake of action. None of the three 
elements can function independently. £'ven the middle stage of contem-
plation or thinking is only a "place of transit." If it would not have 
roots in the outer ~orld or would not result in active measures, it 
would not be fulfilling its function. ''The current of life which runs 
in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips. 1160 
All three have a role, but perception and thinking exiat for the sake 
of behavior. 
In beginning to apply the speculative consequences of this theory 
to theism, James notea in passing that some writers feel that reflex 
action gives '~ £.2.S?_ 2 e:ace to the superstition of a God. 1161 He 
chooses not to enter this debate about the existence of God. Rather• 
!l.e will try to show that if' the human mind is actually a triadic 
structure of impression, reflection, and reaction as the reflex action 
theory indicates, then "a God, whether existent or not, is at all events 
the kind of being which, if he did exist, would form!!!!,~ adequa~e 
possible object tor minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at 
62 the root of the universe." In other words, some outward reality de-
tined as God's nature must be clefined, "is the only ultimate object 
that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's 
60Ibid., P• 114. 
-
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contemplation.1163 Theism then becomes "the centre of gravity ot all 
attempts to solve the riddle of life,--eome falling below it by defect, 
some flying above it by excess, itself alone satisfying every mental 
need in strictly normal measure."64 
This will be, James realizes, a subjective consideration of 
theisra, based on its congruity with our nature as thinkers. The ob-
jective side ot theism, God's actual existence, is left untouched. If 
God ''be real.JJ the living truth," this will indicate that the structure 
ot our mind is actually in accordance with the nature of reality. 
Whether this be the case or not is, according to James, "one of those 
questions that belong to the province of personal faith to deoide."65 
The structure of our mind needs God; whether he actually exists, each 
person is entitled to doubt or to believe on his own responsibilit7 and 
at his own risk. 
Before defining God and theism and undertaking the proof of his 
thesis, James mentions a consequence of the reflex theory of mind that 
he feels not even all pb1siologiats recognize, namely that "it commits 
them to regarding the mind as an essentially teleological mechanism. n66 
In other words, the mind's middle department, the conceiving or theoriz-
ing taculty, functions solely for the sake of ends "that do not exist 
at all in the world of impressions we receive b,- way of our senses, but 
63Ibid., P• 116. 
64Ibid. 
65Ibid. 
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are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether."67 The 
conceiving faculty transforms the world of our impressions into a 
totallJ' di!f erent world, the world of our conception, and this remodel-
ing of the "brute order of our experience" is done in accordance with 
our 'fl\rolitional nature," which includes our subjective purposes, 
preferences, and our fondness for certain effects, forms and orders. 68 
The sum of our actual experience at any given moment .!!! it is 
given is utter chaos. From the mixture of sounds, colors, forms, and 
the various feelings aroused in us we have to pick out "the items which 
concern ws, and connecting them wit.h others far awa:t 1 which we se:y 'be-
long• with them, we are able to make out definite threads of sequence 
and tendency; to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for them; 
and to enjoy simplicity and harmorq in place of what was chaos. n69 We 
talce the real order of the world with all its chaos and "we break it 
into histories, and we brealc it into arts, and we brealc it into 
sciences; and then we begin to feel at home."70 But we do this for 
our own purposes, in reapon.oe to our own concerns, postulating that 
there is a harmony between our "volitional nature" and the nature ot 
things. This the theologian doee, no less and no more than the artist 
or the man of science. 
In coming then to the question regarding the kind of being God 
67Ibid 
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would be if he did exist, the first step is to sort out the essential 
features from among the many meanings the word 'God' has taken on in 
the histor,y of human thought. Setting aside the many sectarian dis-
putes about the attributes o! God and his metaph1aical relation to 
the phenomenal world, James lists as the essential features of theism, 
first, that "God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, 
second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personalit7."71 
Mainly this means that God's personalit7 
la to be regarded, like SD1 other personality, as something 
~ing outside of my own and other than me, and whose existence 
I simp~ come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then, 
which not only makes tor righteousness, but means it, and 
which recognizes us,-auch is the d,£inition which I think 
nobody will be inclined to dispute. 
There have been of course various attempts to fill out the des-
cription or God's personality and manner of his recognition of us, but 
the essential point about the divine personality and ours is "that both 
have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the other's call."73 
The reference to the many attempts in human history to fill out 
the description of God brings us to a point of connection with the re-
flex action theor,y of mind.. There are not onl.1 concrete, particular 
objects that present themselves to the mind and evoke a response; the 
whole universe itself ttknocks on our mental door and asks to be let in, 
and fixed and decided upon and activeq met ... 74 Faiths, systems, phi-
71Ibid., 
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losophies, scepticisms are all attempts by the mind to deal with this 
universe. But the function of all these conceptions of the universe 
is to pass into the third stage, the stage of action. They are the 
middle stage, not the end, and no matter how splendid they seem in 
themselves as conceptions, they have only one function, to define the 
direction which our activity will take. In fact, if two apparently 
different definitions or reality 'WOuld have identical consequences, 
they are actually identical definitiona.75 
Furthermore, no view of the universe will be accepted as rational 
and will satisfy the mind unless it satisfies all three departments of 
the mind., not violating the essential mode of activit7 of a.n;y department, 
or leaving any without a cha.nee to work. Matei'ialism, tor example, with 
its emphasis upon atoms, and agnosticism with its doubting, give a solu-
tion which is irrational to the third department; their conceptions 
otter no proper object for our active powers. Thei81111 on the other hand, 
presents "the most practically rational solution it is possible to con-
ceive. "?6 It calls upon all the energies of our active nature. "At a 
single stroke, it changes the dead blank j! of the world into a living 
thou, with vhom the whole man may have dealings."?? 
-
Because of its ability to challenge man's practical nature, theism 
ia taken as the norm for conceptions of the world. "Infre.-theistic" 
conceptions, such as materialism and agnosticism, are irrational because 
75 4 Ibid., 123- • 
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they are inadequate stimuli to man's practical nature. He will now 
consider "ultra-theistic" conceptions, those that go beyond God. 
One of the essential attributes of God mentioned earlier was that 
he is "a personality lying outside our own and other than us,--a power 
not ourselvea."78 What James means here b;y "ultra-theistic" views is 
any attempt to go be7ond the ultimate duality or God and his believer, 
and to transform it into some sort of identity. Infra-theistic views 
regard the world as an it, theism as a thou, while these other theories 
- -
try to make it part of!!..• This should not be confused with the "oneness 
with God" through self-surrender which characterizes the highest moments 
of theistic consciousness. This is a practical union with God in which 
God and the person are still two. The theist in this case does not 
somehow lose his identity in God or in thought; he knows that he himself 
"simply is, and needs God; and that behind this universe God simpi,. is 
and will be forenr, and will in some WfX3 hear his call."79 He finds no 
need tor continued contemplation on the nature of God, but can respond 
to his God with a religious reaction. 
James•s own choice is to join the theist in the conviction that 
"to the end of time our power ot moral and volitional response to the 
nature of things will be the deepest organ of coimmmication therewith we 
shall ever possess."8o For James, our destiny lies in active co-
operation with God's creation and his purposes, "not in a:rq chimerical 
7Sibid., 
-
P• 134. 
79 135. Ibid., P• 
-
8o 141. Ibid., P• 
-
speculative conquest ot him, not in arr, theoretic drinking of him up."81 
To serve this universe is our task, and the most any theory can do is 
to bring us to that. 
These tour essqs, therefore, provide us with Jamea•s approach to 
belief in general and the religious eypothesis in particular. In the 
process, his underlying view of the world comes through. He consciously 
rejects a monistic view where evil is directly traced to God and must 
somehow be explained as caused by a supposedly good God. When God is 
not 80 directly tied to evil, then there is more hope tor man to deal 
with the indiYidual evils ot life. He rejects determinism as well, be-
lieving that there is scope for man's activity in the universe; he is 
-
not handed a finished product to which he has no contribution. In the 
area of knowledge he rejects scepticism and maintains that man can ap-
proach ever closer to truth. But he believes in truth as an empiricist, 
not an absolutist; we can know the truth, but we cannot know for certain 
that we have reached some kind of absolute truth. We test our lv'Potheses 
by living, trusting that the evidence will tell us whether or not we are 
approaching truth; but no bell will ring to assure us that we have 
arrived. His emphasis is on seeking truth, not merely avoiding errori 
losing the truth through inactivity can be worse than sometimes being in 
error. Finally, rationality involves much l'llOre than a theoretical ap-
proe.oh. The "sentiment" of rationality means a nuency of mind that 
cannot be attained by theoretical reason a.lone. If the mind is to keep 
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"flowing," a view presented to it must speak to a person's practica.l 
and aesthetic nature, his "volitional" nature. The whole man is in-
volved, and more than merely logical needs must be met. The mind is in 
fact a triadic structure, and perception and conception are for the 
sake of action. 
ABS-inst this background James can justify belief in the sense of 
going beyond sensible and scientific evidence. We do in fact go beyond 
such evidence; even science does so, more than it seems willing to ad-
mit. Some questions cannot be answered by science, such as moral questions 
and those involving personal. relations. There a.re times when it is neces-
sary to go beyond scientific evidence, times when not to decide is to 88.'1 
no, and when the action called for is so important that the decision can-
not await more evidence even if it would be forthcoming. Then too there 
are times when the outcome requires our personal contribution, and in 
auch cases our belie! can help to make the proposition true. FinallJ', we 
need a view of the world beyond purely scientific facts to challenge our 
innennost powers and to reply to our deepest needs; it is such a view that 
will make life worth living and maintain the sentiment of rationality. 
The religious hypothesis is on~ such way of going beyond the evi-
dence, providing an unseen order that helps the seen order make sense by 
giving meaning to our efforts. The God of theism, the deepest power in 
th_· universe and a personality who "hears our call," is the best possible 
object for our mind, structured as it is, because he is the one who can 
sustain as well as challenge our deepest powers and give meaning to our 
efforts without causing us to be "swallowed up" in pure thought or 
consciousness. Whether or not God exists, belief in him is the b1pothesis 
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best suited to our structure and our needs because it spoaks to our 
moral and volitional powers, and it is through these powers that we 
corarnunicate with our world in the deepest way. 
Therefore, according to James, belief is reasonable, or in his 
terminology, rRtional. But much of the space in the essays was given 
to belief' in general, and we would expect James to want to give more 
particular attention to the religious hypothesis once belief' in 
general is justified. And, as concerned as he was about remaining 
true to the experiences of the individual, it is only natural that he 
would care::'ully study not just religious belief but individual re-
1igious experiences. Granted that belief of some kind ia necessary, 
this will ahed more light on the ability of the religious hypothesis 
to call forth our belief and answer our deepest needs in a We::J' that is 
rational. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
If a person accepts religious belief as reasonable, as James 
did, this opens up a range of data that would otherwise not be re-
vealed, the area of religious experiences. As a philosopher opposed 
to traditional rationalism, he wanted to defend the reasonableness 
of experience and the need to take it seriously in all its richness 
and complexity; but he was particularly interested in defending the 
reasonableness of religious experience. In ~ Varieties of Religious 
Experience, the Gifford Lectures given at the University of Edinburgh, 
Scotland, in 1901 and 1902, he approached the subject using the per-
spective of the psychologist, providing a descriptive survey of the 
religious propensities of man. But he remained a philosopher as 
well, intent on determining the rationality of religious experience, 
rationality in his sense of reasonableness. This chapter will be an 
attempt to pull together his criteria for judging the rationality of 
religious experience, and an examination of his conclusions. 
From the point of view of method, there can be two orders of 
inquiry in any investigation. The first considers the nature, con-
stitution, origin, and history of whatever is under investigation 
43 
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and issues in an existential proposition. The second considers its 
importance, meaning, or significance now that it is here. and the 
investigation about it results in a proposition of value, or what 
may be called a spiritual judgment. The present discussion will 
therefore involve two basic questions: what are the religious pro-
1 pensities of man, and what is their philosophic significance? 
The study will not focus on the "second-hand religious life" 
of ordinary believers who simply follow the conventional religious 
observances that have been handed on to them by tradition. Rather, 
it will be concerned with "the original experiences which were the 
pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated 
2 
conduct." These experiences will be found in the "geniuses" of re-
ligious life, people for whom religion was much more than a dull 
habit. These are the religious leaders and founders for whom reli-
gion was intensely personal, men and women with a keen awareness of 
God and a vision of their own mieaion in the world. Like geniuses 
in other areas, those in religion have often shown symptoms of 
nervous instability. Religious leaders even more perhaps than 
other kinds of genius 
have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility, 
•• _. often ••• have led a discordant inner life, 
••• had melancholy during a part of their career, 
• • • been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and 
frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices, 
1Williem James, The Varieties of Reli ious 
York: Mentor Books, New American Library, Inc., 19 
erience (New 
, P• 22-23. 
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seen visiona, and presented all sorts of pec~iarities 
which are ordinarily classed as pathological. 
' A concrete study cannot ignore these pathological aspects, even 
though there is often the fear that explaining such connections with 
religious experience will explain away the significance of the reli-
gioue experience itself. , This is not true; nor ie the charge that 
religious experience arises simply from some organic condition in a 
person. As a matter of tact all of our states of mind are in some way 
conditioned by our organic processes. But to begin explaining away 
the value of religious experience because of any connection with 
pathological experiences or organic conditions is to blur two modes 
of inquiry. The value of a particular religious experience is deter-
mined by the effect it has on the person, the contribution it makes 
to his life, not on the way in which the experience may have origin-
ated. The origins of a person's religious experience are often 
inaccessible to us, but we can see and evaluate the effects in the 
4 
way he lives his life. 
This concern with the effects of religious experience in a 
person's lite, the practical fruits of his religious belief, will 
be central to our study in this chapter. It will be one of the 
criteria James uses in determining the rationality of religious 
experience. This interest in evaluating practical effects is 
further developed later in James's theory ot pragmatism. In this 
3Ibid. t p. 24. 
4 ~., P• 34. 
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sense ~ Varieties of Religious E:xperience is the foundation for 
his Pragmatism. 
And yet, while it is the effects of religious experience that 
we evaluate, it is helpful to study the origins and accompanying 
circumstances as well, even if this involves us in exaggerated and 
sometimes pathological experience. These exaggerated experiences 
"play the part in mental anatomy which the scalpel and the micro-
scope play in the anatomy of the body. 115 We can then see the exper-
ience out of its more usual surroundings and become familiar with a 
wider range of its variations. At the same time it is important to 
see that religious phenomena are "special cases of kinds of human 
experience of much wider scope."6 Religious melancholy is still 
melancholy, religious happiness is still happiness, and it helps 
us to understand the distinctive significance of the religious 
experiences by comparing them with other experiences of the same 
general type. But as important as this comparison is, the test 
of value remains the same: by its fruits, not its roots. 
Among the many different possible ways of approaching religion, 
then, James has chosen personal religion in its "first-hand" ex-
perience, rather than the institutional religion which develops 
later. He takes religion to mean 
the feelings, acts, and experiencee of individual men 
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves 
5 ~·• P• 35. 
6 ~·• P• ?fl. 
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to stand ~relation to whatever they may consider 
the divine. 
In order to include systems of thought such as Buddhism 
which do not actually assume a God, and yet call for e religious 
response from their followers, the vord "divine" will be taken in 
a wider sense to denote "any object that is godlike, whether it 
8 be a concrete deity or not." But on the other hand if the term 
"godlike" becomes too general and includes everything that men 
have ever considered "gods," the study will lose its specifically 
religious character. A man's religion is indeed his total reaction 
upon life, but it cannot be said that every total reaction upon 
life is a religion. ''There are trifiing, sneering attitudes even 
tovards the whole of life; and in some men these attitudes are final 
and systematic."9 Regardless of the value of such "trifiing and 
sneering" attitudes as ways of looking at life, it would be strain-
ing our ordinary understanding of the word to call them "religio·. s." 
For moat men religion implies a serious state of mind which "says 
'hush' to all vain chatter and smart wit," but is opposed as well 
to the "heavy grumbling and complaint" which fails to see meaning 
in the vorld's tragedy. 
7 
8 
There must be something solemn, serious, and tender 
about any attitude which we demoninate religious. If 
glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must 
Ibid., P• 42. 
Ibid., P• 44. 
9 ~·· P• 45. 
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not scream or curse. So I propose -- arbitrarily 
again, if you please -- to narrow our definition 
once more by saying that ••• the divine shall mean 
for us only such a primal reality as the individual 
feels impelled to respond to sole~y and gravely, 
and neither by a curse nor a jest. 
A compar.iaon of religion with morality in general provides 
another characteristic. Both are concerned with the way we face 
the universe, but morality often tends to simply accept the law 
of the universe as if it were a yoke, wherea.s with religion the 
response is much more enthusiastic. And this added dimension of 
emotion, James feels, is found nowhere but in religion. 11 We are 
in fact dependent upon the universe, and this dependence will call 
forth sacrifices and surrenders of some sort. In "those states of 
mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to 
as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at 
the very best without compleint.n12 In the religious lite, however, 
"surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused." Religion then 
makes easier an acceptance of the universe which is necessary any-
way, and performs a !Unction "which no other portion of our nature 
can so successfully fulfill. 013 That religion thus fulfills a 
10Ib"d 
-L·· P• 47. 
11Ibid., P• 54. 
12Ibid., P• 56. 
13Ibid., P• 56. 
basic need in man is a conclusion, says James, to vhich ve 'Will be 
led by the empirical investigation of religious experience. 
The first form of religious experience ve will consider 'Will 
be the "religion of healthy-mindedness." Noting that happiness 
is one of the chief concerns in life, James states that the ordinary 
believer will often regard the happinesa which a religious belief 
affords as a proof of its truth. Whether to do so is correct or 
14 
not, it emphasizes the importance of happiness in a man's life. 
For some people happiness seems to be congenital. They see 
God e.nd nature as good, can think no ill of man, and find it im-
possible to linger over the evils in the world. They are "once-
born" rather than "tvice-born" in that they seem to need no deliver-
ance from evil. Emerson and \tlhi tman a.re examples of this "heal thy-
mindedness 
good."15 
• • • vhich looks on all things and sees that they are 
In addition to this involuntary healthy-mindedness by which 
R person immediately feels happy, there is e more voluntary and 
systematic type. As every abstract way of conceiving things telces 
one aspect as the essence and temporarily disregards the others, 
systematic healthy-mindedness talces good as the essential aspect 
of being and deliberately excludes evil from its vision. This is 
not as intellectually dishonest as it may seem at first. "Happiness, 
14Ibid., P• ?6. 
15Ibid., P• 83. 
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like every other emotional state, has blindness and insensibility 
to opposing facts given it as its instinctive weapon for self-
16 protection against disturbance." This deliberate adoption of an 
optimistic attitude can then grow into a religious policy in a way 
that is certainly not absurd. This process answers a tendency we 
all have to divert our attention trom evil as much as we can. 
An especially interesting religious example of systematic 
healthy-mindedness, according to James, is the "Mind-Cure movement." 
Its doctrinal sources include the tour Gospels, New England trans-
cendentalism, Berkeleyan idealism, Hinduism, spiritim, and evolu-
tionism with an emphasis on progress. Its characteristic feature 
is "an intuitiTe belief in the all-saving power ot healthy-minded 
attitudes" such as courage, hope, and trust, along with a contempt 
for doubt, fear, and worry. 17 Thia belief haa been generally cor-
roborated by the experience of those people who have found a healing 
for their mind and body, and the spread of the. movement is due mainly 
to these practical fruits. Whether or not there are people who 
could not be influenced by~these ideas, the large number who have-
been so influenced makes it worthy of consideration and respect. 
The mind-cure movement shares the general basis of all reli-
gious experience, acknowledgment that man has a dual nature and is 
connected with two spheres of thought. But for the mind-cure the 
16 1!!!!!•, P• 83. 
17 88 Ibid., P• • 
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essential vice in the lover sphere is fear. In the higher level, 
the spiritual in man appears as ''partly conscious, but chiefiy 
subconscious; and through the subconscious part of it we are already 
one with the Divine without any miracle ot grace, or abrupt creation 
of a new inner man." 18 While fear and all egoistic modes of thought 
lead to destruction, the way to life is to come into a conscious 
realization of our onenesa with the Divine and to open ourselves 
fully to the flow of the Infinite IJ.fe through us. To the degree 
to which a person realizes his oneness with the Infinite Spirit, 
to that extent he will exchange "disease for ease, inharmony for 
harmony, suffering and pain for abounding health and strength."19 
James lists several accounts by people who have been restored to 
health through this mind-cure doctrine. 
The mind-cure movement is obviously optimistic. Evil is empiri-
cally present for its followers as for anyone, but there is no specu-
lative explanation of it; evil is something to be transcended and 
forgotten, with attention focused on the regenerative power of optim-
istic thinking.20 
James then points out a psychological similarity between the 
mind-cure movement and the Lutheran and Wesleyan movements. All 
begin with a man's realization that there is something wrong with him, 
and his question about what he must .!!!?, to become well and whole, or 
18Ibid.' P• 92. 
19Ibid., P• 92. 
20 96-97. Ibid., P• 
r 
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in religious terms, saved. The answers too are similar. Luther 
and Wesley tell a perlSOn he is already saved if he would only believe 
it; the mind-curers tell him he is already well and whole, if he 
would only realize his real being. And it is the adequ.-. :.y of the 
mind-cure message to the mental needs of a large portion of mankind 
that accounts for its spread. The same type of adequacy accounted 
for the spread of the Lutheran and Wesleyan movementa. 21 
James notes that the "official moralists" advise us never 
to relax our efforts to change for the better, but rather to be 
vigilant and to shrink from no effort. But the Lutheran, Methodist, 
and mind-cure movements seem to otter evidence tor the position that 
there are many people for whom, at least at a certain stage in their 
development, a change ot character tor the better comes about by 
just the opposite of this advice, by a surrender, a relaxing, a 
letting go, resigning oneself to higher powers. This is a kind of 
salvation through self-~~espair, a dying to be truly born. James 
concludes that "this is certainly one tundamental form of human 
experience. Some say that the capacity or incapacity for it is what 
divides the religious from the merely moralistic character.n22 At 
any rate, mind-curers have shown that this form ot regeneration by 
relaxing and letting go, ''psychologically indistinguishable from 
the Lutheran justification by faith and the Wesleyan acceptance of 
21 ~·• P• 97• 
22 ~., P• 99. 
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free grace, is within the reach of peraon.s who have no conviction 
of sin and care nothing for the Illtheran theology.n23 But the results 
of this relaxation and abandonment of effort are facts of human nature, 
no matter what theor;y we adopt for their ultimate explanation. 
Furthermore, along with reaaoned advice, the founders of mind-
cure ::ave made great use of the subconscious life and have emphasized 
"systematic exercise in passive relaxation, concentration, and medi-
24 tation," which does not seem to differ intrinsically from the 
practice of "recollection" in Catholic discipline. Both involve 
an swarenesss of the presence of God and a oneness with God which 
gives a peraon strength in the midst of his daily activities. 
Science, of course, would not accept mind-cure's belief in 
s higher power that vill talce care of us if we only throw ourselves 
upon it. And yet mind-cure uses science's own method of verifies-
tion; it invites a peraon to live as if its hypothesis were true 
and to see whether or not his experience will verify it. The growth 
of the movement indicates that for many people experience does 
verify it. For them, at least, science cannot veto the mind-cure 
movement. From this James concludes that the universe is a "more 
1118ny-sided affair than a:ny sect, even the scientific sect, allows 
for."25 The world can be handled according to many systems of ideas, 
23Ibid., P• 99. 
24Ibid.' P• 102. 
25Ibid.' P• 107. 
each providing some kind of profit while omitting some other. Evi-
dently, then, science and religion 
are both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world's 
treasure-house to him who can use either of them practically. 
Just as evidently neither2is exhaustive or exclusive of the other's simultaneous use. 
Science, therefore, cannot veto the mind-cure movement for those 
for whom its practical fruits have been helpful, and in this sense 
mind-cure is a rational religious view. Furthermore, it speaks to 
the common human desire for happiness and builds upon what seems to 
be a fundamental form of human experience in its regeneration by relax-
ation and surrender to higher powers, an experience shared by the Lutheran 
and Wesleyan movements, and shared as well in its method of medita-
tion and recollection by Catholicism and by Eastern religions. It is 
this basis in shared experience, along with the practical fruits, 
which provides the test of rationality for mind-cure, and healthy-
mindedness in general, as a religious belief. 
However, there are people who cannot so easily rid themselves 
of the consciousness of evil. For some, evil is merely a wrong cor-
respondence of their life and their environment, curable by changing 
either of the two factors or both. For others, evil is something more 
radical, a wrongness in man's nature which no superficial rearranging 
can cure, requiring rather a supernatural remedy. In psychological 
terms we can speak of the different "thresholds" of a person, with 
26Ibid., P• 107. 
55 
some people living on the 11aunny side" of their misery-threshold, while . 
the depressed and melancholy live beyond theirs.27 
There is in fact evidence that all is not as optimistic as the 
healthy-minded would have us believe. The joys of this life are inse-
cure at best. 
Unsuspectedly from the bottom of every fountain of pleasure, 
as the old poet said, something bitter rises up: a touch of 
nausea, a falling dead of the delight, a whiff of melancholy, 
things that sound a knell, tor fugitive as they may be, they 
bring a feeling of coming from a deeper region and often have 
an appalling convincingness. The buzz of life ceases at their 
touch as28 piano-string stops sounding when the damper falls 
upon it. 
Even if a person has not experienced this precariousness in his 
own life, seeing the misfortune of so many other people would force him 
to recognize that his good fortune could easily be otherwise. Our solu-
tion must go deeper than actually escaping misfortune. 
The fact that we can die, that we can be ill at all, is what 
perplexes us. •• :-We need a life not correlated with death, 
a health not liable to illness, a kind of good that will not 
l·'erish, a good in fact that fiies beyond the Goods of nature. 29 
This is why a view of life that does not give meaning beyond the 
present moment will never satisfy. If the present moment leads nowhere and 
has no deeper meaning, no amount of ignoring or forgetting will hide its 
hollowness. 
We will see later the joy of "twice-born" people whose religion is 
27 ~., P• 116-117. 
28Ibid., P. 118. 
29 ~., P• 121. 
non-naturalistic. But the securest way to the happiness they report has 
been as a matter of fact through a radical pessimism that involves the 
person in pathological melancholy. After describing various kinds of 
pathological depression, James cites examples of religious melancholy, 
beginning with Tolstoy, vhose personal account describes how his life 
gradually lost all its meaning and zest, and became dreary and joyless. 
John .Bwlyan's melancholy, described next, resulted from his psychopathic 
temperament and sensitive conscience, leading to doubts and fears about 
the conditj.on.of his ovn personal self. The third type of melancholy, 
based on Jan1es's o.vn experience, takes the form of tear of the universe. 
How a person can recover from such religious melancholy will be described 
later, but the point here is to realize the radical pessimism experienced 
by such ''morbid-minded" people and to see how far removed it is from 
healthy-mindedness. 'l'o people suffering from such religious melancholy, 
the attitude of healthy-mindedness seems shallow indeed.30 
In attempting to compare the two viewpoints as an impartial ob-
server, James feels that morbid-mindedness "ranges over the wider scale 
of experience.n31 The method of healthy-mindedness, to ignore evil 
and live only in the light of good, does work for many people, and as 
long as it does it is a valUB.ble viewpoint for them. But it breaks down 
when faced with melancholy. Furthermore, the evil facts which it 
chooses to ignore are a genuine part of reality. It may be that there 
30ibid., P• 124-137. 
31
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are some forms of evil which will never fit into a total view of the 
universe and will be best handled by being ignored. But in the meantime, 
they are still there, and it would seem that a view which admits their 
presence and deals with them would be a more adequate philosophic doctrine 
than healthy•mindedness with its unwillingness to give them any atten-
32 ' 
tion. We saw in the previous lecture the rationality that healthy-
mindedness does have as a religious belief. We see now that it is limited 
to certain people and certain conditions, and it breaks down when asked to 
deal witJl melancholy and evil. Here another kind of religion is needed, 
a religion of deliverance. 
James will now focus attention on the "twice-born," the person for 
whom natural good is insufficient in itself and for whom evil is very 
real, and who must therefore die to the natural to be reborn in the 
spirit'lJal. First will come a treatment of the general psychological 
basis of the twice-born character. 
This basis lies in "a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the 
native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and in-
··-.~· 
tellectual conati tution. "~' · Some people seem to be born with their 
impulses consistent with one another, but others in varying degrees find 
much more of a confiict within them, echoing the words of St. Paul, 
"What I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that I do." The normal 
evolution of character then consists in the "straightening out and 
32Ibid., P• 138-139. 
33Ibid., P• 141. 
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unifying of the inner self •••• The higher and the lower feelings, 
the ueetul and the erring impulses, • • • must end by forming a stable 
system of !unctions in right subordination. ,,34 This process of unifi-
cation itself may come gradually or quickly. "It may come through 
altered feelings or through altered powers of action; or it may come 
through new intellectual insights, or through experiences which we 
shall later have to designate as 'mystical.'"35 However the unification 
comes, it brings vi.th it a characteristic kind of relief and happiness. 
It is important to notice that reaching this unification through 
religion is only one way; the precess of unification is a basic human 
process, and the religious types of regeneration are only one species 
of a genus that includes other types as well. The new birth may in 
fact be away from religion and morality, and the unification may be 
brought on by such diverse passions as "love, ambition, cupidity, 
revenge, or patriotic devotion."36 
When this process of, the unification of the self is seen in reli-
gious terms, we have the experience of conversion. To understand the 
psychological elements in this conversion process, it helps to notice 
how a person's ideas, aims, and objects form different internal systems 
relatively independent of each other. As a particular aim becomes the 
center of his attention, the ideas and objects connected vi.th another 
34 Ibid., P• 143. 
35Ibid., P• 146. 
36 ill!·' P• 147. 
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aim fade into the background. When the President of the United States, 
for example, is away on a fishing trip, his aim and the system of ideas 
related to it is much different from the aim and ideas when he is tune-
tioning as President. Often in an ordinary ds.y we pass from one aim and 
focus of interest to another. But even in a deeper and more basic way a 
person's interest may shift periodically from one aim to another and 
leave him with the experience of being a "divided self." The same feel-
ing of being divided may result when one aim .is actually responsible for 
his activities, but there are other aims present to him on the outskirts 
of his mind as ''pious wishes" or "fleeting aspirations. n37 
As our lives go on, then, our aims and interests shift, and, per-
haps, even change. ''Things hot and vital to us to-day are cold to-morrow, n.38 
often leaving us with the feeling of being a wavering and divided self. 
When the "focus of excitement and heat, the point of view from which the 
aim is taken, ••• /;_Come to li!i'J permanently within a certain system, 
• • • if the change be a religious one, we call it a conversion, especi-
ally if it be by crisis, or sudden."39 If we refer to the "hot place" 
in man's consciousness, the group of ideas to which he is devoted and 
from which he works, as the ''habitual centre of his personal energy," 
the conversion means that religious ideas which previously were peripheral 
in his consciousness now take a central place and become the habitual 
center of his personal energy. 
37 ~·· P• 16o-161. 
38 ~-. P• 161. 
39 Ibid., P• 162. 
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Precisely how or why this shift takes place is hard to say, often 
~en for the person experiencing it. It seems that at times a new per-
ception or a sudden emotional shock will create a new "centre of gravity" 
in a person and the structure will remain permanent, the person having 
then "found tlimself" or gotten himself "together." 
James then refers to Professor Starbuck's conclusion that the con-
version process in young people brought up in evangelical circles is par-
allel to "that growth into a larger spiritual life which is a normal 
. ~ phase of adolescence in every els.as of human beings." The parallels 
in age, symptoms, and results bring one to the conclusion that conversion 
"is'in its essence a normal adolescent phenomenon, incidental to the 
passage from the child's small universe to the wider intellectual and 
41 
spiritual life of maturity." Even adult conversions :follow a similar 
passage through a sense of incompleteness and anxiety to the relief of 
a different and usually wider view. 
Conversions will have different characteristics depending upon the 
individual. Some may involve mainly a change of behavior with little 
intellectual readjustment or theology. Others may have been precipi-
tated by the meaninglessness of life and will involve more of an intel-
lectual character. Furthermore, not everyone is open to conversion; for 
various reasons, religious ideas do not become for some people the center 
42 
of their personal energy, although even this condition can change. 
~ 164. ~-· P• 
41 Ibid. t P• 164. 
42Ibid., P• 167-168. 
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In fUrther describing the conversion process, James refers to the 
common human experience of trying to remember a name. The first ap-
pros.ch is definitely to try, working at it with a conscious effort. But 
sometimes this fails, and the harder we try the less hope there seems to 
be, "as though the name were jammed, and pressure in its direction only 
kept it all the more from rising."43 But often if we give up trying 
to remember and think of something else, soon "the lost name comes saun-
tering into your mind, as Emerson says, as carelessly as if it bad never 
44 been invited." The previous effort had started some kind of hidden 
process which continued after the effort ceased. 
This difference between the conscious and voluntary and the uncon-
scious and involuntary way in which mental results are accomplished also 
gives us two types of conversion. In the voluntary type the change is 
usually a gradual building up of a new set of moral and spiritual habits, 
although even here there seem to be critical points where the movement 
forward is more rapid. "Our education in any practical accomplishment 
proceeds apparently by jerks and starts, just as the growth of our 
physical bodies does. 04.5 
The more interesting type of conversion, though not radically dif-
ferent from the voluntary, is the involuntary or "self-surrender" type. 
In fact, even in the most voluntarily built-up regeneration there are 
stages when self-surrender is required; and in most cases the final step 
43Ibid., P• 168. 
44 169. ~·· P• 
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which brings a person to unification is one of self-surrender, not 
activity.46 
James again refers to Dr. Starbuck in explaining why self-surrender 
seems indispensable as the final stage in conversion. A person moving 
toward conversion has two things in mind; first of all, and most of all, 
he is conscious of his OYn wrongness or incompleteness, the "sin" he is 
trying to moTe away from. Secondly, there is also some sort of positive 
ideal he hopes to reach, but this is much less clear to him than the 
very real feelings of incompleteness he is passing through. Meanwhile 
''his conscious straining& are letting loose subconscious allies behind 
the scenes, which in their way work toward rearrangement."47 But this 
rearrangement toward which these deeper forces is moTing is probably 
quite different from what he consciously conceives. As a result, the 
final conversion may be interfered with by his voluntary efforts being 
off the maifk, just as the word we try to remember seema "jammed" by 
our efforts to remember it. "When the new centre of personal energy 
has been subconsciously incubated so long as to be just ready to open 
into nower, 'hands off' is the only word for us, it must burst forth 
unaided!"48 
The self-surrender in the conversion process often talces the form 
of temporary apathy or exhaustion with the struggle, so that the person 
simply seems to give up and no longer care. This may be just the t;yp!! 
46 170. ~·· P• 
47Ibid.' P• 171. 
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of self-surrender needed for the breakthrough to come. 
James here points out the.t psychology and religion are in agree-
ment up to this point, "that there are forces seemingly outside of the 
conscious individual that bring redemption to his life."49 Psychology 
refers to these as "subconscious" and not tre.nscending the individual's 
personality, whereas Christian theology insists they are direct super-
natural operations of God. He will return to' the differences later, but 
it is important to notice the agreement at this point. 
Next James moves on to cases of instantaneous conversio~ the more 
dr8Dl8.tic type of conversion which seems to be so closely connected with 
divine grace. The more usual Protestant sects and the Catholic Church 
generally set lji,ttle store by such conversions for ordinary believers, 
but Methodism and certein other groups take them as essential signs that 
salvation has been effectively received. Jar::es then raises the question, 
"Is an instantaneous conversion a miracle in which God is present as he 
is present in no change of heart less strikingly abrupt?".50 He asks too 
whether those who experience instantaneous conversion are the only ones 
who really partake of Christ's nature whlle others merely seem to. 
James approaches the question psychologically, beginning with the 
concept of "field of consciousness." He points out the growing realiza-
tion that the unit of mental life is not the single, definitely outlined 
"idea," but more probably the total mental state, "the entire wave of 
consciousness or f'ield of objects present to the thought at a:n.y time," 
49Ibid., P• 173 • 
.50Ibid., P• 186. 
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which is impossible to outline with any definiteness. "As our mental 
fields succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around 
which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious 
fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable."51 The 
width of these fields will vary among individuals, and within the same 
individual at different times. Great organizing geniuses have broader 
fields of vision, for e:.eample; the ordinary person at times of illness 
or fatigue may find his field narrowed to a point where he feels oppressed 
and contracted. But the important point is the indetermination of the 
margin. "Our whole past store of memories noats beyond this margin, 
ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass of residual powers, 
impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self stretches 
52 continuously beyond it." · 
This brings us to the notion of subliminal or extra-marginal con-
aciousness. 
The most important consequence of having a strongly developed 
ultra-marginal life of this sort is that one's ordinary fields 
of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which 
the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, 
talce for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or 
inhibitiona ot action, of o~~essive ideas, or even of hallucin-
ations of sight or hearing • .-
James feels therefore that whenever we see such phenomena, we should 
first of all try to determine whether "it be not an explosion, into the 
fields of ordinary consciousness, of ideas elaborated outside of those 
51ill!!· t P• 187. 
52Ibid. t P• 187. 
53Ibid., P• 189. 
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In applying this to instantaneous conversions, James abstracts :from 
v 
the question of their value :for the spiritual life o:f' the individual and 
considers only their psychological side. From this point of view he 
sees so many similarities between conversions and what is found outside 
of conversions that he suspects the difference between a sudden and a 
gradual convert to lie not in the presence of a miracle in the one and 
something less divine in the other, but rather in a simple psychological 
peculiarity, 
namely, that in the recipient of the more instantaneous grace 
we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a 
large region in which mental work can go on subliminally, and 
from which invasive experiences, abruptly upset5~ng the equi-
librium of the primary consciousness, ma;y come. 
Seeing instantaneous conversion as a result of such an invasive 
experience from the subliminal region r8ther than as a miracle should not 
be objectionable, James maintains, even to people who feel such conver-
siona to be essential. He reminds us again of the need to judge events 
or conditions not by their origin but by the empirical standard of their 
fruits for life. 
If the fruits 12:£. !i.!! of the state of conversion are good, 
we ought to idealize and venerate it, even though it be a 
piece of natural psychology; if not, we ought to make short 
work with i~ no matter what supernatural being may have 
infUaed it. 
A study of these fruits does not indicate that a suddenly converted 
54Ibid., P• 190. 
55Ibid., P• 191. 
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man is radically different in nature from any other man. There is no 
distinctive radiance that would indicate that there are two objective 
classes of human beings separated by a chasm. The real fruit of conver-
sion lies in the momentousness of the fact for the individual himself and 
the spiritual excellence in terms of love of God end man which it leads 
to in his life. But that excellence can also be found in gradual con-
verts end people who have passed through no crisis; it is not distinctive 
only of sudden conversion. Furthermore, Starbuck's studies have shown 
conversion to be a ;3tage in ordinary spiritual growth, and Professor 
George Goe has discovered some evidence at least "that sudden conversion 
is connected vith, the possession of an active-subliminal self."57 But 
again, recognizing this psychological basis for conversion does not 
diminish its significance; its value is determined not by its origin but 
by what it accomplishes in a person's life. And conversion does seem to 
bring a person to a new level of spiritual vitality, so· that he !! born 
anew. 
James feels, therefore, that a developed subliminal self is neces-
ssry for instantaneous conversion. But he points out that this does not 
necessarily exclude eome kind of direct presence of the deity. It is 
possible that if there are higher spiritual agencies that touch us dir-
ectly, it may be through our subconscious region that they do so. ''The 
hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Sublim-
inal might remain ajar or open."58 The perception of some kind of 
57 Ibid. t p. 193. 
58 Ibid., P• 195. 
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external control which is an essential feature of conversion might be 
just that, with the extern:il. control ~1orking through our subconscious. 
But again, the mere fact of tha control being external is not the eaeen-
tial point; it could be external and still be either diabolical or 
divine. The test of value is in the effects. He will return to this 
question of the higher power. 
James then describes, again from personal accounts, the feelings 
which fill the time of the conversion experience. First is the sense of 
a higher control, that the conversion is not dependent upon one's own 
efforts. There is as well an affective experience of assurance that all 
is well, characterized by peace, harmo~, and a willingness to be. This 
assurance and loas of vorey seems to enable the parson to perceive truths 
he had. not known before, and to see a newness and beauty in the world he had 
not seen previously. The conversion experience may also involve uncon-
aciousneaa, convulsions, visions, and involuntary utterances, but these 
do not seem to have aJl1 essential spiritual significance or lead to 
greater fruits for life. But most charaoteriatio of the conversion pro-
oeLJs is the ecstasy of happiness produced in the convert.59 
Regarding the transiency or permanence of such abrupt conversions, 
James f eela the essential point is not the duration but the fact that it 
shows a person the "high-water mark" of his spiritual capacity. As a 
matter of fact, while there are cases of backsliding, the cases of in· 
stantaneoua conversion studied indicate a changed attitude toward life 
59 Ibid., 19.5-203. 
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vhich is generally constant and permanent, with some fiuctuation in 
60 
ardor. 
The process ot conversion, therefore, has a psychological basis 
and is a particular type of the general process of unification of the 
divided self. Even instantaneous conversion, the type that vould seem 
to have such a direct relation to the divine, has a p87Chological 
basis in the subliminal or subconscious region. This p87chological 
basis is part of the rationality of the religious experience of con-
version. It is a shared human experience the mind can "flow with" and 
"feel at home with," that does not jar the mind as unreasonable. And 
yet it does not destroy the value of the experience as religious. The 
presence of a higher pover is not ruled out; such a power may indeed 
touch our lives through the subliminal or subconscious region. But 
the real test of conversion as a human as well as a religious experience 
is again its "fruits not its roots." 
Before beginning a description of the fruits of religious life and 
an evaluation of them, James offers a psychological explanation for the 
differences in character among human beings. The diversity lies 
"chiefiy in our differi§ susceptibilities .2!._ emotional excitement, and 
in the different impulses .!!2, inhibitions vhich these bring in their 
train."61 OUr moral and practical attitude at any given time is alw111s 
a resultant of two sets of forces within us, impulses pushing us one 
way and inhibitions holding us back. Inhibitions can be strong deterents, 
but if a strong enough emotional excitement takes hold they crumble. 
60 Ibid., 20,5-6. 
-
69 
Thia is what happens in a person who either gradually or suddenly begins 
to live in hia religious center of personal energy and is actuated by 
spiritual enthusiasms. Inhibitions which once held him back no longer 
do9 and his life after conversion takes on distinctively different 
characteristics. 
''The collective name for the ripe fruits or religion in a charac-
ter ia Saintliness."62 There are certain features of saintliness which 
are universal, James sliY's, the same in all religions. Saintliness in-
Tolves, first of all, the "feeling of being in a wider life than that 
of this world's selfish little interests; and a conviction, not merely 
intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an Ideal 
Power." Secondly, saintliness is characterized by a "sense of the 
friend~ continuity of the ideal power with our ovn life, and a willing 
self-surrender to its control." Thirdly, an elation and freedom result, 
"a.a the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down." And fourthly, 
there is a shift of the emotional center towards loving and harmonious 
affections. These characteristics of saintliness have several practical 
consequences: asceticism, to the point where self-surrender may become 
self-immolation; strength ot soul, whereby the eense of enlargement of 
life OTercomes inhibitions and fears and new levels of patience and tor-
titude are reached; purity, or the cleansing from life of sensual ele-
ments and a.D1thing that would cause spiritual discord; and charity, an 
increase of tenderness tor fellow creatures resulting from the shift of 
the person's emotional oenter.63 
In commenting further on charit1 and brotherly love, James remarks 
that this brotherhood ot man would seem to follow logically from theism's 
conception of the fatherhood of God, but in fact it does not derive 
solelf from theism. It is present in .Stoicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, 
and seems to be a characteristic affection to which our nature;is 
liable. Its basis in human eXperience would seem to stem from the tact 
that joy, which is so much a part of the conversion experience, is an 
expansive affection, "and all expansiYe affections are self-forgetful 
and kindly so long as they endure."64 Even brotherly love to the point 
of loving one's enemies, as it is found in saintliness, is not self• 
contradictor,.; it is "the extreme limit of a kind of magnanimity with 
which, in the shape of pitying tolerance of our oppressors, we are 
fairly tamiliar. 065 This important element of saintliness is not ir-
rational• it has a basis in human experience, and if a level of emotion 
could be reached where enmity would no longer inhibit the friendlier 
interests in men, this "might conceivablf transform the world."66 
James then gives examples and a further description of the transi-
tion f'rom tenseness and self-responsibility to peace and imperturbabil-
it1 which results f'rom the shift to a religious center of energy, noting 
again that this is accomplished most often simply by relaxing. ''This 
63Ibid., 
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abelndonment of self-responsibility seems to be the fundamental act in 
specifically religious 1 as distinguished from moral practice." Thia 
seems to be a widespread and basic religious experience, "capable of 
entering into closest marriage with every speculative creed. 1167 
The purity of life characteristic of the saintly person refers to 
his desire for the consistency that results when all his mind's objects 
and occupations are ordered with reference to the spiritual excitement 
which is now the center of his life. Ile becomes very sensitive to arJ7 
inner discord or inconsistency. His desire for moral consistency and 
purity may develop to such a degree that he finds the secular \tlOrld too 
full of shocks and can unify his life only by withdrawing from this outer 
world. Just u an artist achieves harmo111 by dropping out whatever jars, 
the saint~ person may avoid discord by a similar omission. Monasteries, 
with their "changeless order, characterized by omissions quite as much as 
constituted of actions," mq provide a person with "that inner smoothness 
and cleanness which it is torture to him to !eel violated at every turn 
by the discordancy and brutality of secular existence."68 
The next "symptom of saintliness" which James describes more fully 
is aaoeticism, which he sqa is an activity that can originate on dit-
terent psychological levels. Asceticism can be simply an expression of 
"hardihood," a disgust with too much ease. The temperance it involves 
can be the reault of the love of purity described above which shuns any-
thing sensual. Asceticism can also be the result of love, a willingness 
67Ibid., P• 229. 
-
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to make sacrifices because of the deity a person loves. The mortifica-
tions and torments can likewise result from pessimistic feelings about 
oneself, along with theological beliefs about expiation 1 so that the 
person feels he is escaping worse sufferings hereafter by doing penance 
now. In its psychopathic form asceticism may be entered upon as a kind 
of fixation or obsession, or, by a perversion of sensibility a person nl81 
find plea.sure in what are normally pain-giving stimuli.69 
James refers then to the growing tendency in the Western world to 
avoid pain, especially the self-inflicted mortifications that were car-
ried to such extremes in the past. Against this changing background 
"any deliberate tendency to pursue the hard and painful as such and for 
their ow sakes might well strike one as purely abnormal."70 And yet 
it is really only the extreme which is abnormal. Some people need a 
certain amount of austerity and discipline to add zest to their lives, 
or else living becomes too easy. Therefore, asceticism in itself is 
not abnormal. 
James next offers a further description of poverty, one of the 
11ecclesiastioally consecrated'' ways of self-mortification. Here too 
there seems to be a paradox, as the instinct of ownership is a funda-
mental part of man's nature, and yet a re l'.lilCiation of ownership has 
been an important part of saintliness in Christianity aa well as Hindu-
ism, Buddhism, and other religions. The rational basis for poverty 
lies first of all in the long-standing distinction between men who 
73 
.!!!!!. and men who !E!.•71 There has long been an awareness that an ac-
cumulation of material goods can weigh a person down, and if his life is 
based on having, he is less free than he would be if the emphasis were 
on doing or being. Poverty in its religious form moves beyond this 
11athletic attitude" to something related to the fundamental myster,' of 
religious experience, "the satisfaction found in absolute surrender to 
the larger power."72. Reliance on material goods seems to limit that 
surrender, and so as a person enters a new center of personal ener@:1 and 
submits to a higher power, a disinterest in material goods often follows 
as a sign that the higher power is trnl.1 the center of interest. Poverty 
can also stem partly from a desire for the equality of all God• a 
creatures, a lack of interest in dignities, honors, or goods which would 
set a person above his fellow man.73 
In the next section James will attempt to judge the value of the 
saintliness he has described, to see if the fruits of religion can help 
us determine its value for human lite. It will be, to parody Kant, a 
"Critique of Pure Saintliness." 
The approach again will be empirical, not "descending upon our 
subject f'rom above" with fixed definitions and dogmas, but considering 
the actual fruits of saintliness without a:trf special .! priori theologi-
cal system, and asking whether on the whole religion is approved by its 
fruits. In forming this judgment, "our general philosophic prejudices, 
71Ibid., 
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our instincts, and our comon sense will be our only guides."74 
To a person who would object to this empirical approach, James 
replies that history shows this in fact to have been how religions and 
deities changed. As man's insight into nature and social arrangements 
developed, particular characteristics of his deity also changed. Today 
a God who would require human sacrifices is unacceptable, while at 
' another time such ferocity and power in a deity were respected. Histor-
1 
ical circumstances certainly play a part in this, but man's needs also 
are a contributing factor. In a very real sense, men have chosen their 
gods because of the fruits their belief has yielded, the practical impli-
cations of the definition or their deity. 
So soon aa the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon 
as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or 
thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they ap-
peared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected 
upon, the deit¥5grew discredited, and was erelong neglected and torgotten. 
In this way various religions have approved themselves, ministering to 
certain vital needs in man. "When they violated other needs too strongly, 
or when other taiths came which served the same needs better, the first 
religions were aupplanted.."76 
James•s purpose here will be to "test saintliness by common sense, 
to use human standards to help us decide how tar the religious life com-
74Ibid., 
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mends itself as an ideal kind of human activity."77 This means considering 
the practical effects of religious living to determine the rationality of 
religious experience. Aa he had made clear at the beginning, his concern 
is genuine, first-hand religious eXperience, not religion in its inati-
tutional form. Through the course of history, much evil has been done in 
the name of religion, but first-hand religious experience cannot be blamed 
' for the behavior of members ot particular religious groups or institutions.) 
But one charge religious experience would seem liable to is over-
zealousness, or fanaticism. In any area, we admire a genius !or his 
vision or hie contribution, realizing that his extreme view leaves out 
other views; we admire him without trying to imitate hie extremism. 
Saintliness will have its examples of such extrend.sm too. But "excess, 
in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or want of balance; for 
it is hard to imagine an essential faculty too strong, if only other 
faculties equally strong be there to co~perate with it in action ... ?8 
Strong faculties are no problem if they are balanced; they then result in 
a strong character. 
In the life of saints, technicalJ~ so called, the spiritual 
faculties are strong, but what gives the impression of 
extravagance proves usually on examination to be a relative 
deficiency of intellect. Spiritual excitement takes patho-
logical forms wheneve79other interests are too tew and the 
intellect too narrow. 
To avoid fanaticism, both elements must be present--a sufficiently wide 
range of interests and an adequate intellect. 
71 259. Ibid., P• 
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The devout love of God, one of the basic fruits of saintliness, 
when unbalanced becomes fanaticism, which is only "loyalty carried to 
a convulsive extreme." The deficiency of intellect creates an imbal-
ance with the loyalty. "When an interusely loyal and narrow mind is 
once grasped by the feeling that a certain superhuman person is worthy 
of its exclusive devotion, one of the first things that happerus is that 
Bo it idealizes the devotion its"'lf." The wrshipper'a attention is 
focused on adequately realizing the merits of the deity, who cannot be 
praised enough. This leads to a jealouay for the deity's honor, 
strong enough at times in history to launch crusades and massacres, 
and leading at other times at least to intolerance and persecution. A 
greater degree of intellect with the devotion would enable the person 
to see that he is serving, and creating, a despotic kind of God mindful 
only of his own glory. The God it reveals and the narrowness it betrays 
rule out this fanaticism as a worthwhile fruit of the religious life. 
Such fanaticism exists only in an aggressive person. In gentle 
characters when devotion is intense and the intellect feeble, the mind 
is too narrow for more than one kind of affection. "When the love of 
God takes possession of such a mind, it expels all human loves and human 
81 uses." This, James maintains, is innocent enough, but the exclusion 
of all practical human interests is again too one-sided to be reasonable. 
James coins the term "theop;':.thic" to describe this excess of devotion. 
The one difficulty with this kind of devotion, as James's examples indi-
8oibid. 
81 Ibid., P• 267 • 
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cate, is that the person is so taken up with ecstasy for God that he is 
of little or no use to his neighbor, which in Christianity at least is a 
definite imbalance. Furthermore, people of this type who write of their 
experiences of God and his love for them reveal a God who could hardly 
be generally believed in. "Smitten as we are with the vision of social 
righteousness, a God indifferent to everything but adulation, and full 
of partiality for his individual favorites, lacks an essential element 
of largeness."82 Again, a lack of intellect creates an imbalance and 
keeps the devotion from being rational in James's sense. 
Purity is the next saintly virtue subject to excess. When sensi-
tivity and narrowness occur together, they require a pure and simplified 
world to live in. An aggressive person in this situation will find order 
and purity by forcibly stamping out disorder and divergence. A more re-
tiring person will leave the disorder in the world at large and find his 
ovn order end purity b,- creating a smaller world. This may lead to drop-
ping one external relation after another as interfering with his spiri-
tual consciousness, beginning with amusements, conventional society, 
business, and even family. As noted earlier, this simplicity can be 
found by leaving the world and entering a monastery. The uniformity 
found in some communities, monastic and other types, which includes 
stereotyped costume, hours, and habits, can create the kind of simpli-
city and purity 'Which some people find e need for. 83 
Thia desire for purity end simplicity can be carried to an excess, 
82Ibid., P• 269. 
83Ibid., P• 'Z?2. 
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however, as the lives of some saints testify. But our final judgment in 
this area will depend on the idea of God we have and the kind of conduct 
we feel he is pleased with. For example, in the Catholicism of the six-
teenth century it was acceptable to "leave the world to the devil whilst 
saving one's own soul." Today there is more of an emphasis on helping 
to create a better world, "and to be of some public or private use is 
also reckoned as a species of divine service." Purity and simplicit7 of 
life are therefore not the only values, "and it is better that a life 
should contract many a dirt-mark, than forfeit usefulness in its efforts 
to remain unspotted.••84 
Tiie difficulty with tenderness and charity, the next fruits of re-
ligion to be considered, is that they often seem un.ealistic and out of 
place to the man of the world. Perhaps in a more perfect environment, 
where everyone was a saint, it might be practical to live these virtues, 
but in the real world "Resist not evil" and "Love your enemies" can too 
easily be taken advantage of. 
The whole modern scientific organization of charity is a 
consequence of the failure of simply giving alms. The 
whole history of constitutional government is a commentar, 
on the excellence of resisting evil, and when one cheek 
is smitten,8~r smiting back and not turning the other 
cheek also. 
And yet the issue is not that simple. There is a real need for 
the charity and tenderness of' the saint, with his willingness to help a 
brother first and then find out if' he is wortb1 1 his readiness to trust 
84Ibid., P• 275. 
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and be duped many times rather than always to be suspicious. The charity 
of the saint is often prophetic, pointing to a time to come when such 
concern will hopefully be more widespread. It ia likewise a real crea-
tive force, often stimulating people to become wort~ ot respect by 
~reating them with respect. "One fire kindles another; and without that 
over-trust in human worth which they show, the rest of us would lie in 
spiritual stagnancy. u86 Force can destroy enemies, but by risking the 
first step through charity and non-resistance, the saint can sometimes 
change enemies to friends. Even what seems at times to be an excess of 
charity and tenderness can be a positive contribution to our world. 
It is not difficult to see how asceticism, the next fruit of the 
religious life, can lead to pathological excesses. But it is important 
to consider the good intention of asceticism rather than the uselessness 
o! some of ita acts. 
For in its spiritual meaning asceticism stands for nothing 
less than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy. It 
symbolizes • • • the belief that there is an element of real 
wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor 
evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an 
appeal to the soul's heroic8?8sources, and neutralized and cleansed away by suffering. 
This much asceticism every man needs, to answer the challenge to heroism 
involved in facing and overcoming the evil in his lite. 
We have seen, therefore, that the fruits of religion, the charae-
teristics of saintliness, can lead to excesses, sometimes harmful ones. 
A person must have a sufficiently wide range or interests, and the 
86Ibid., P• 277• 
87Ibid., P• 281. 
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intellect must be able to work with the spiritual energy to maintain a 
balance. In all !airness it mus~ be noted too that the narrowness in 
particul~ cases often has to do w;th the historical circumstances and 
the accepted ways or eXpressing spiritual energy. But on the whole, the 
•'.!Xrunination ot religion by practical common sense and the empirical 
method leaves it "in possession of its towering place in history. 
Economically, the s~intly group of qualities is indispensable to the 
world's welfare."88 We have seen earlier how a conversion to a religious 
center of energy can broaden a person's vision, challenge his powers, and 
bring him a deep peace and joy. These practical fruits for the pe~son 
himself, coupled with the contributions of a genuine religious life to 
the world of man, form a rational basis for the religious hypothesis aa 
it is lived with varying degrees of saintliness. 
James's approach in all of this has been empirical; if the fruits 
of religion are good, to that extent the religious hypothesis is r~tional 
and true. But he realizes that many people would prefer to approach the 
question from the other direction, first establishing the objective truth 
of the religious ~othesis, not just its utility. If the God of reli-
gion really exists, then the things men do to meet his demands find their 
rational basis in the fact that God exists and makes these demands. In 
an attempt to address this question of the truth of religion, James will 
now consider mysticism, since this is a religious experience in which 
some people have claimed to see truth in a special way. He will later 
determine what religious philosophy can add to the truth of the reli-
88Ibid., P• 290. 
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gious }\,vpothesis. 
Since "mysticism" and "mystical states of consciousness" are, like 
"religion," terms that can take on many meanings, James proposes four 
characteristics which will be present in an experience which he would 
-·:all mystical. The first mark is ineffability. A person who has had a 
mystical experience cannot adequately describe it in words; it must be 
experienced to be appreciated. And yet, though mystical states are 
similar to states of feeling, they also have a noetic quality. 
They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed 
bJ the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all 
inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they 08§17 
with them a curious sense of authority for aftertime. 
Thirdly, mystical states are generally marked by trrlllaiency, lasting 
often only half an hour or so. Finally, although preliminary operations 
such as fixing the ~ttention or going through certain bodily performances 
may facilitate the approach of the mystical state, the characteristic 
state of consciousnees itself, once it sets in, is marked by passivity. 
The person feels "as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed some-
times as if he were grasped and held by a superior power."90 
James then gives several personal accounts of mystical experience 
and its methodic cultivation in certain religions. But he approaches it 
"in aeries," beginning \tiith phenomena which aro part of ordinary human 
experience ann are the rudiments of mystical experience in its religious 
forms. ''The simplest rudiment of mystical experience would seem to be 
89Ibid., P• 293,. 
90Ibid .. 
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that deepened sense ot the significance of a maxim or tormula which oc-
casionally sweeps over one.n91 It is the experience of words, state-
ments, or even sights, sounds, or smells which we are very familiar 
with, suddenly taking on deeper meaning. "A more pronounced step for-
ward on the mystical ladder is found in an extremely frequent phenome-
non, that sudden feeling, namely, which sometimes sweeps over us, ot 
having 'been here before,• as if at some indefinite past time, in just 
this place, with just these people, w were already saying just these 
things. u92 Then too there are those momenta, perhaps when walking out-
doors, when everything seems to have a meaning even though it cannot be 
put into words. The rudiment of mysticism in theae experiences would 
seem to be the sudden awareness that "sweeps over" a person, an aware-
ness quite different from any purely intellectual insight. 
Moving further along in the series, James says: 
The next step into &11'Btical states carries us into • • • the 
consciousness produced by intoxicants and anaesthetics. 
especiall7 by alcohol. The sway of alcohol over mankind is 
unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical 
faculties of human nature, usually crushed to ell§~b. by the 
cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. 
These various human experiences are in a sense the rational basis 
tor mysticism; they are types of consciousness of which mysticism is a 
particular religious variety. James concludes the description with 
several examples of religi$us mysticism and its cultivation. 
91Ibid., P• 294. 
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The goal in this section was to determine the contribution mysti-
cism could make toward the objective truth of the religious hypothesis, 
and James surmnarizes his findings in this area. "Myatical states, when 
well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely author-
itative over the individuals to whom they come."94 The mystic feels that 
he has had a direct experience of truth, and this becomes a force that he 
can live by. This goes beyond strictly logical reasoning, and the vision 
that the mystic has had is certainly not something that someone else can 
argue him out of. 
James•s second conclusion is that no authority emanates from mys-
tical states "which should mske it a duty for those who stand outside of 
them to accept their revelations uncritically. 1195 The enlargement, 
union, and emailcipation characteristic of mysticism can fit with several 
different world views, and so the mystic cannot expect the particular 
world view tied to his mystical experience to be accepted uncritically 
by those who have not shared that experience. In fact, there can also 
be a "diabolical mysticism," a sort of religious mysticism "turned up-
side down," with many similarities to religious mysticism but moving 
toward pessimism and destruction. "It is evident that from the point of 
view of their psychological mechanism, the classic mysticism and these 
lower mysticisms spring from the same mental level, from that great 
subliminal or transmarginal region of which science is beginning to ad-
mit the existence, but of which so little is really know."96 The 
94Ibid. t P• 323. 
95Ibid., P• 324. 
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revelations of mystioi81Jl cannot be accepted uncritically, therefore; they 
must be tested by empirical methods. 
Finally, James concludes that mystical states 
break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic 
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses 
alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. 
They open out the possibility of other orders ot truth, in 
which, so tar as ~hing in us viWly responds to them, we 
~ freely continue to have taith. 
Mystical states are "excitements like the emotions of love or am-
bition" by which tacts already objectively before us ''make a new connec-
tion with our active life. They do not contradict these tacts as such, 
or deey anything that our senaes have immediately eeized."98 Mystical 
states give a person a vision that goes beyond the partial view rendered 
by the tacts ot sense and understanding alone, and give him the excite-
ment needed to live according to that view, all without violating the 
tacts presented by sense and understanding. 
This study ot myatici81Jl has provided an indication of its basis in 
ordinary human experience and the need tor evaluating its fruits and rev-
elations empirical~. But the person looking for the objective truth of 
religion and the existence of its God Wlltuld still be unsatisfied. Mys-
ticism does not speak with that kind of authorit7 to people outside of 
it. At best, the higher 111stical states 
point in directions to which the religious sentiments even 
ot non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy ot 
the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. 
97Ibid. 1 P• 324. 
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They off er us p;ypotheses, hypotheses which we may voluntarily 
ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset • • • • 
It may be that possibility and permission of this so199are all 
that the religious consciousness requires to live on. 
But lll8lJ1 people might still teel that it God exists, then there should 
be something to compel belief, something that is closer to necessa?'J' truth 
than merely possible hypothesis. Philosop~ bas often claimed to prove re-
ligious truth b1 coercive argument, and th:ts will be James's next area for 
consideration. 
Can philosophy indicate whether the sense or divine presence so 
basic to religious experience is a sense or anything existing objectively? 
JaJDes begins his answer by explaining his opinion that "feeling is the 
deeper source ot religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas 
are secondary products, l.ik.e translations of a text into another tongue."100 
I! man had never felt inner unhappiness and a need of deliverance on the 
one hand and 111stioal emotion on the other, all basic religious feelings, 
his intellectual view of the universe probably would have led him to a bet-
ter and better scientific explanation of reality, with no need to believe 
in arI3' kind of deity or power beyond acience and his own abilities. What 
caJne first, therefore, was the basic feeling ot unhappiness and need of 
deliverance, and the sense of a higher power in whom that deliverance 
could be found; the speculative philosophical and theological formulas 
were then "over-beliefs, buildings-out performed ey the intellect into 
99Ibid. 1 P• 328. 
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directions ot which feeling originally supplied the hint."202 
Again, some would perhaps vant the procedure reversed. They would 
like to have the existence of God proved by pure reason, in universal 
terms that would logically compel the intellect, and would theretore 
justify the religious feelings they have. Dogmatic theology and philo-
sopJ:o' have at times pretended to do that, providing an ideal refuge for 
"spirits vexed b7 the muddinesa and accidentality ot the world of sen-
sible things.n182 But, James points out, theology baaed on pure reason 
has not proven universally validt as a matter of historical fact it has 
not compelled the intellects ot men and banished differences and sects. 
And it will never be able to, according to James. 
I believe, in tact, that the logical reason ot man operates 
in this field of divinity exactl,y as it has al'W81'S operated 
in love, or in patriotism, or in politics, or in any other 
ot the wider affairs of life, in which our passions or our 
1111atical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. It finds 
arguments for our conviction, for indeed it baa to find 
them. It amplifies and defines our faith, &;r-dignifies 
it and lends it words and plausibtOjty. It hardly ever engen-
ders it; it cannot now secure it. · 
James does not discuss the rational arguments for the existence of 
God in detail. He feels that they are alrea<11 weakened by their inabil-
ity to convince people who do not already believe in God, as well as by 
Kant's criticism, and in particular by the ef'f'ect of Darwinian ideas on 
the argument from design.1o4 He feels that philosophy is eq~ unable 
101Ibid., P• 3.30• 
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to define the attributes of God. After summarizing these attributes 
that systematic theology has deduced, James applies to them the principle 
of pragmatism as elaborated by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to 
pragmatism, beliefs are rules for action. "If there were eny part of a 
thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, 
then that part would be no proper element of the thought's signif'icance.11105 
There are some attributes of God deduced by dogmatic theology, such as his 
aseity and his lack of distinction between potentiality and actuality, 
which call for no differences in ms.n's behavior, and have therefore no 
practical consequences. "For my own part, although I dislike to se.y 
aught that may grate upon tender associations, I must frankly confess 
that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot con-
ceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that an.y 
1o6 
one of them should be true." There are attributes of God that do have 
consequences for man's behavior, but again it cannot be proved by reason 
alone that a God with these attributes exists. "In all sad sincerity I 
think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellec-
tual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experi-
ences is absolutely hopeless. 11107 
Philosophy therefore cannot provide a rational basis for religious 
experience in the sense of universally valid logical proofs for the ex-
istence of the God of religion. But it can contribute to the rationality 
105Ibid. t P• 339. 
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of religious experience in another va::f • We are thinking beings, and our 
religious and mystical experiences as well as our other experiences must 
be translated into thought. In particular, if we hope to exchange our 
feelings and experiences with others, we must use general and abstract 
verbal formulas. As religious experience is thus put into words, philo-
aopb1 can help compare the different formulations and point out what is 
local and accidental to each. It can confront these religious construe-
tions with the results of natural science and help eliminate doctrines 
that are scientifically absurd or incongruous. 
Sitting out in this way unwortb1 formulations, she can 
leave a residuum ot conceptions that at least are pos-
sible. With these she can deal as b;ypotheses, testing 
them in all the manners, whether neSffOAve or positive, 
b7 which hypotheses are ever tested. 
Philosophy can perhaps point to a particular hypothesis which seems most 
closely verified by experience and within that hypothesis help to dis-
tinguiah between "what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the ex-
pression of it, and what is to be literally taken. 11109 In doing this, 
philosoph1 can act as a mediator between believers, pointing out what is 
common and essential in religious beliefs. But this philosophizing can 
never be done in a vacuum, away from concrete lite and personal exper-
ience. It must begin with and continually return to the religious ex-
perience which will alwa;y-s be larger and deeper than an:s verbal formula-
ti one. 
In returning now to the description of religious experience, James 
1o8Ibid. 
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will conclude with a few more characteristic elements. Against the back-
ground of the previous discussion of secondary intellectual formulations 
of religious experience, he notes how a person's aesthetic life plays a 
part in the way he chooses a religion with particular "over-beliefs." 
Some people prefer intellectual simplicity and purity, while others choose 
richness and imagery. He cites the difference between the Catholicism and 
Protestantism of his time as an example. He admits in fact that in the 
previous section he spoke "too contemptuously of the pragmatic useless-
ness of the f'amoua scholastic list of attributes of the deity."11° For 
some people these attributes may add verbal richness and elegance to their 
religious view, even though the particular attributes may have no other 
practical significance for their lives. 
He moves now to three elements represented in most books on reli-
gion as essential: sacrifice, confession, and prayer. Sacrifice has 
always been a part ot religion, from burnt offerings in primitive reli-
gions to offerings of the heart and renunciAtions of the inner self in 
contemporary religions. He has already spoken of the essential place and 
rational basis of sacrifice as "symbolic of the sacrifices which life, 
whenever it is taken strenuously, calls for."111 
James sees a psychological basis and need for confession as an 
element of religion. 
It is part of the general system of purgation and cleansing 
which one feels one's self in need of, in order to be in 
right relations to one's deity. For him who confesses, 
110ibid., P• 348. 
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shams are over and realities have begun; he has exteriorized 
his rottenness. It he has not actually got rid of it, he at 
least no longer smears it over with a hiJpocritical '1l2w ot 
virtue--he lives at least upon a basis of vera~ity. 
The basic human experience, regardless of the various religious forms 
confession may take, is that the shell of secrecy is opened, allowing 
"the pent-in abscess to burst and gain relie:t.n113 
The third essential characteristic of religion is prayer. Science 
would dismiss certain kinds of prayer of petition, for a change in the 
weather, !or example. But if prayer is taken in the wider sense as mean-
ing "every kind of inward communion or conversation with the power reoog-
nized as divine, we can easily see that scientific criticism leaves it 
untouched.11114 Prayer in this sense of a conscious relation between 
the person and the power upon whom he depends is essential to religion, 
and is in fact what distinguishes religion from ethics or humanism. It 
does not require any set formulas, but this prayer is realized as some-
thing active and mutual. There is a conviction that in prayer something 
is actually taking place between the person and his God. There have been 
llUlD1 opinions on what is effected by pr81er, but the genuineness of re-
ligion is bound up with this belief that prayer is somehow effective. 
"Through prayer• religion insists, things which cannot be realized in 8If1 
other manner come about; energy which but for prayer would be bound is by 
prayer set free and operates in some part, be it objective or subjective, 
of the world of facts."115 
112Ibid 
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The examples that James cites show that the forms and effects of 
prayer have been viewed in various ways. Some people pray asking God for 
specific needs; for others, prayer is not tied as directly to particulars, 
but arises from a more general awareness of their dependence upon God. 
For some the effects of prayer are seen not so much in changing external 
circumstances and events as in opening themselves to changes within, so 
that as fear and egoism fall away through their conversation with God, 
they see the world in a new light and can live with renewed energy. "We 
meet a ~ew world when we meet the old world in the spirit which this kind 
116 
of prayer infUses." But the fUndamental point in all forms of prayer 
is that "sp~ritual energy, which otherwise would slumber, does become 
active, and spiritual work of some kind is effected really.n117 
In drawing his conclusions based on this study of religious exper-
ience, James emphasizes again the importance of personal experience and 
feeling in religion. In the field of religion there is a great variety 
of thought and theory-, but the basic feelings and actions are quite aim-
ilar. The theories are secondary explanations of the deeper and broader 
experience of man. And the faith of the religious person is a ''biolog-
ical as well as a psychological condition." It is a force that men live 
by and that sets loose in them energies that are creative and productive 
for themselves and for the world. From this subjective side alone re-
ligion is vindicated in a sense by the fruits it produces. 
But in addition to considering the subjective utility of religion, 
116 
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James feels we should still try to determine its intellectual content and 
ask whether or not this content is truet to see if this inquiry can add 
anything to the rationality of religious experience. 
With all the variations of theory and over-belief t there is a cer-
tain basic description of experience upon which all religions would 
agree, involving first of all an uneasiness that man feels, a sense that 
there is something wrong about him as he naturally stands, and secondly, 
a solution to this uneasiness in that he can be saved from the wrongness 
by making proper connection with higher powers. The first step in this 
experience is for the person to feel the wrongness and to be uneasy about 
it; in this he has already begun to move beyond it. "Along with the 
wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but 
a most helpless germ. With which part he should identify his real being 
is by no means obvious at this stage."118 But when the stage of solution 
arrives, i.e., in religious terms when he achieves salvation, he chooses 
to identify his real being with the higher part of himself, which still 
may seem germinal. 
He becomes conscious that this higher part {"of himselfJ is 
conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, 
which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which 
he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on 
board of and save himse~;9when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck. 
This general description includes the various experiences James had 
mentioned and explained in detail: the feeling of a divided self and the 
118Ibid., P• 383. 
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consequent struggle; the change of the personal center ot energy; the 
surrender of the lower self in a kind of letting Sol the feeling that 
one is being helped by an external. power and united with it; and the 
feelings of ~eourity and joy- that result. 
Regarding this sUll!llary of religious experience, James continues: 
The part of the content concerning which the question of 
truth most pertinenti,- arises is that 'MORE of the same 
quality' with which our own higher self appears in the 
experience to come into harmonious working relation. Is 
such a •more• mere]J- our own notion, or does it realJ.3' 
exist? If so, in what shape does it exist? Does it act, 
as well as exist? And in what torm should we conceive ot 
that 1unio%owith it o:t which religiows geniuses are ao 
convinced? 
James approaches the formulation of his response through the 
psychological area of the subconscious self. We have already seen how, 
even apart from religious considerations, there is much more to our 
lives than we are aware ot or experience at 8.1J1 given time. The study 
of religious experiences such as conversion, JJtYsticism, and pr~er has 
shown how invasions from the subliminal or transmarginal region, the 
"fringes" of experience, can be a part of religious life. James's 
hypothesis then is that "whatever it ruq be on its farther side, the 
•more• with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected 
is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our consoious 
life."121 This approach, he feels, provides a point of contact with 
psychology and science by describing!!!!!, side of religious experience 
in terms they would accept, while remaining true to the experience ot 
121Ibid., P• 386. 
-
94 
an external control. But describing this side of the "more" just barely 
opens the door. It is regarding the other side that various over-beliefs 
are tormed. 
James then states his own ~othesis or over-belief regarding the 
farther aide of the "more" which comes in contact with a person through 
his subconscious region. 1'The further limits of our being plunge, it 
seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the 
aens.ible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the 1D1stical region, 
or the supernatural region, whichever you cboose. 11122 God is the name 
used by Christians for this higher part of the universe. And it is in 
' the phenomenon of ''prayerful communion" that God produces real effects 
upon us. Through prayerful communion 
work is actually done upon our finite persona1ity, for we 
are turned into new men, and consequences in the WaJ ot 
conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative 
change. But that which produces effects within another 
reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if 
we had no philosophic '~use for calling the unseen or 
mystical world unreal. 
In other words, "God is real since he produces real etfecta."124 
To a person used to the elaborate arguments for the existence of 
God and their detailed results, Jamea•s conclusion may seem meager in-
deed. He does not in tact feel that his study of religious experience 
can even go so far as to say that God ia infinite, only that he ia a. 
higher power in contact with us and friendly to ua. But this is a 
belief he can act upon and that gi'V99meaning to his lite. 
122Ibid., 
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We and God have business with each other; and in opening our-
selves to his influence our deepest desti~ is fulfilled. 
The universe, at those parts of it which our personal being 
constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or tor the 
better in prop~~ion as each one or us fulfills or evades 
Qod•s demand.a. 
The rational basis for religious experience in William James does 
not lie, therefore, in theoretical reason alone; it is not a universally 
valid logical proof for the existence of God. Rational for him includes 
the practical reason as well as the theoretical. In response to inner 
needs, it is rational to go beyond scientific evidence while remaining 
true to it, because there is so much more to a man's life than what 
science can capture. In fact, if a person is to find meaning, going be-
Y<>id scientific evidence is a basic need. 
Religious belief, as a particular way of going beyond the evidence, 
answers this need in a manner that is uniquely suited to the basic struc-
ture of man. Whether through the religion of healtlv-mindedness, or for 
the twice-born person through a process of conversion, a man is put in 
touch with a higher power and finds within himself a new center of spir-
itual energy. This contact with a higher power meets man's basic needs 
and challenges his powers in a way that other world views cannot. Natu-
ral religion, scepticism, materialism, and purely humanistic ethics all 
:tall short and lea.Ye a person with the feeling that the world is irra-
tional, as James has argued above. The world view of theism which 
answers the baaic needs of man has roots in his ordinary experience; re-
ligious experiences are first of all human experiences, of the same type 
as those common to all men. This shared experience is likewise a 
rational basis, since the structure of religious experience is therefore 
125 Ibid., P• 389. 
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familiar and does not jar a person's sentiment of rationality. 
The religious IvPothesis ~'her commends itself as reasonable by 
its fruits for the world in the beneficial effects it produces through 
the energy of the aaintfy person. Especially his tenderness and charity 
are prophetic ot a more ideal age of man, and can often be creative of 
that ideal. But a person must have a sufficiently wide range of interests, 
and his intellect must be capable of avoiding harmt'ul fanaticism in 
practice, just as it must criticize deficiencies in theory. 
In addition to these subjective indications of its rationality, 
from its basis in common experience the religious IvPothesis at least 
points to the actual existence of a higher power, actual becauso this 
power seems to work real effects in a person through prayerful communion. 
This is tar from a universally valid logical proof, and yet it doea not 
contradict scientific evidence. According to Jamea•a over-belief, this 
higher power would work its effects through the subconscious region. His 
view thus is !aithtul to psychological evidence, going beyond pa,chologr 
without going against it. 
Given man•a situation, existing in a world much larger than any 
part he can put into words at a given time, this limited amount of ob-
jective evidence for religion 11181 be all he can hope for. For William 
James the religious hypothesis was rational enough to live by, and in 
fact to call forth a creative and meaningful life in the world. He would 
aak no more from ~ theory. 
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